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CONTRACT AS AGREEMENT
Lawrence M. Solan*
A contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of law to
certain acts of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily accom-
pany and represent a known intent. If, however, it were proved by
twenty bishops that either party, when he used the words, intended
something else than the usual meaning which the law imposes upon
them, he would still be held, unless there were some mutual mis-
take, or something else of the sort.
-Judge Learned Hand1
INTRODUCTION
Broad theories of contract law are intentional in nature, whether
based upon the rights of the individual as an autonomous actor, 2 the
benefits to society of encouraging people to engage in bargained-for
transactions, 3 or the justice due those who have relied on the
promises and representations of others. 4 No one speaks, for example,
of the freedom to be bound by something one did not intend. Bar-
© 2007 Lawrence M. Solan. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
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1 Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
2 See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 2, 83-89 (1981).
3 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 cmt. c (1981).
4 See L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages:
1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 53-57 (1936). The seminal work organizing contract law around
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
gains imply volition. Acts in reliance come only after an understand-
ing that someone has made a commitment. However contract law is
constructed, at the very least, one would expect it to take as its point
of departure the players' actual intentions.
Yet, for generations law students have been taught that the law
governing the formation of contracts is by and large objective in nature,
although it has some subjective elements. It is the appearance of intent
that matters most. Many casebooks say so, 5 as do texts6 and treatises. 7
The Restatement incorporates a largely objective approach to contract
formation as well, although its key provision dealing with the interpre-
tation of contracts is both objective and subjective.8 While it often
refers to mutual assent, the Restatement makes clear that its concern is
only with outward manifestations of mutual assent. Such manifesta-
tion occurs through promising or performing,9 and promising is itself
reliance issues is GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (Ronald K.L. Collins, 2d
ed. 1974).
5 See, e.g., BRUCE W. FRIER &JAMESJ. WHITE, THE MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS 9
(2005) ("This theory has dominated American contract law since the late nineteenth
century .... "); CHARLES L. KNAPP, ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW 34 (5th ed.
2003) ("The substitution of an 'objective' approach for the 'subjective' one previously
taken by Anglo-American law in such cases is commonly said to be one of the central
tenets of the classical contract law system.").
6 See, e.g., ROBERT A. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 39-40 (2004);
JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACT LAW § 2.2, at 26-28 (5th ed.
2003); W. DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES 20 (1996).
7 SeeE. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.6, at 115 (4th ed. 2004) ("By the end
of the nineteenth century, the objective theory had become ascendant and courts
universally accept it today. In the words of a distinguished federal judge, "'intent"
does not invite a tour through [the plaintiff's] cranium, with [the plaintiff] as the
guide.'" (quoting Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810, 814 (7th Cir. 1987)));
1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 4:1, at 241 (4th ed. 1990) ("[A]s a general principle, the inquiry will focus not on
the question of whether the subjective minds of the parties have met, but on whether
their outward expression of assent is sufficient to form a contract."); see also 1 ARTHUR
LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 4.12, at 628 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed.
1993) ("The cases demonstrate plainly enough that a person's expressions as under-
stood by the other party, may bind the person even though the person's own inten-
tion and meaning were different."). Corbin, however, expressed doubt about the
viability of such a theory, given that the plain meaning of a text is only plain by virtue
of its uncontroversially reflecting the intent of the drafter, which, of course, is a sub-
jective matter. See id., § 4.12, at 628.
8 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 (1981); see also discussion
infra notes 196-211 and accompanying text.
9 Id. § 18 ("Manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange requires that each
party either make a promise or begin or render a performance.").
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defined as a manifestation of a commitment. 10 The actual states of
mind of the parties are not the subject of legally relevant inquiry."'
Almost a century after he wrote the opinion in Hotchkiss v. National
City Bank of New York, Learned Hand's twenty bishops still make their
way into discussion, whether through the case law 12 or the scholarly
literature. 13 While there is some debate about how and when this
state of affairs developed,1 4 there is little controversy about its
existence.
10 Id. § 2(1) ("A promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from
acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a
commitment has been made.").
11 Id. § 21 ("Neither real nor apparent intention that a promise be legally bind-
ing is essential to the formation of a contract, but a manifestation of intention that a
promise shall not affect legal relations may prevent the formation of a contract.").
12 For recent examples, see Bock v. Computer Associates International, Inc., 257 F.3d
700, 708 (7th Cir. 2001); Roye Realty &Developing, Inc. v. Arkla, Inc., Nos. 94-6218 & 94-
6305, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 3352, at *22 n.17 (10th Cir. Feb. 28, 1996); Ferranti Inter-
national, PLC v. Jasin, No. 98-CV-5412, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6663, at *25 n.5 (E.D.
Pa. May 5, 2000), rev'd, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3691 (3d Cir. Feb. 22, 2001); Travelers
Property & Casualty Co. v. Restortek, Inc., No. 98 C 3438, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2034, at
*2 (N.D. Il1. Feb. 18, 2000); Time Warner Sports Merchandising v. Chicagoland Processing
Corp., No. 95 C 1364, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 491, at *5-6 (N.D. Il. Jan. 9, 1998);
Agroindustria Nacional, S.A. v. Henry Broch & Co., 976 F. Supp. 758, 760 n.3 (N.D. Ill.
1997); and Angelou v. African Overseas Union, 33 S.W.3d 269, 279 n.6 (Tex. App. 2000).
13 See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo, The Norms of Contract: The Fairness Inquiry and the
"Law of Satisfaction "-A Nonunified Theory, 24 HOFSTRA L. REv. 349, 361 (1995); Melvin
Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1743, 1757
(2000); Chad McCracken, Hegel and the Autonomy of Contract Law, 77 TEX. L. REv. 719,
737 (1999); Todd Rakoff, Washington v. Davis and the Objective Theory of Contracts, 29
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 63, 78-79 (1994); G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern
Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REv. 431, 440 n.3 (1993); Harvey L. Temkin, When Does the
Fat Lady Sing?: An Analysis of "Agreements in Principle" in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 FORD-
IAM L. REv. 125, 132 n.27 (1986).
14 For a historical perspective on the development of the objective theory, see
Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpreta-
tion, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 427, 428-29 (2000). There is extensive commentary on this
history, with considerable disagreement among scholars as to its course. See GILMORE,
supra note 4, at 39-59; MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERIcAN LAW
1780-1860, at 180-88 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 1977) (documenting the continued exis-
tence of the subjective will theory into the late nineteenth century). For some recent
commentary, see Larry A. DiMatteo, The Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable Person
Standard and the Subjectivity ofJudgment, 48 S.C. L. REv. 293, 305-16 (1997); Menachem
Mautner, Contract, Culture, Compulsion or: What Is So Problematic in the Application of
Objective Standards in Contract Law?, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 545, 553-59 (2002).
All agree that Holmes and Williston played important roles in bringing about the
final victory of this approach in American law in the early twentieth century, see GIL-
MORE, supra note 4, at 21-30; HORWITZ, supra, at 90, 200, 237; DiMatteo, supra, at
296-97; Mautner, supra, at 551-52 & n.25; Perillo, supra, at 443-44, although there is
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The objective account relies heavily on cases in which an individ-
ual makes a statement that is reasonably construed as a promise, and
for which he has bargained for something in exchange. When the
time comes for performance, the promisor denies having intended to
commit himself to the deal. The cases routinely say that it does not
matter what he thought.15 What matters is whether a reasonable per-
son would understand his statement as a promise. If so, then he is
bound-even if twenty bishops vouch for him.
Because the promisor is, naturally enough, also bound by his
promise in the routine case in which he does intend to be bound, his
intent appears to be irrelevant. The law provides the same result
regardless of what he was thinking, so long as a reasonable person
would construe his statement as a commitment to perform. This con-
fluence has led judges and scholars alike to hypothesize that objective
analysis is at the core of contract law. 16
This Article argues that this objective account emanates from too
narrow a vantage point. It ignores certain situations in which it would
not be reasonable to construe a statement as a promise, and it fails to
take into account the understanding of the promisee, which is an
important variable in determining contractual liability. Most prob-
lematic for the objective account is that when both parties agree that a
commitment has been made, the promisor is bound, and when
neither believes that a promise has been made, the promisor is not
bound. Objective considerations are irrelevant. Even when a reasona-
ble person would construe the promisor's statement as a commit-
ment, courts will not enforce a statement to which neither party
subscribed. 17 By the same token, courts will enforce a promise to
which both parties agreed, even if a reasonable person would not have
understood it as a promise. 18
When the additional scenarios generated by considering the
promisee's state of mind and additional situations in which it is not
reasonable to infer a promise are added to the mix, the objective the-
ory has little explanatory power. A theory at the very least should con-
considerable disagreement about the earlier roots of this approach. I will not recount
the different versions of this history here.
15 See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911);
NBC Universal, Inc. v. Paxson Commc'ns Corp., No. 650-N, 2005 De. Ch. LEXIS 56, at
*14 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005); Faulkner v. Am. Cas. Co., 584 A.2d 734, 739 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1991); Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777, 778
(Mo. Ct. App. 1907).
16 See supra notes 5-7, 15 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 36-51 and accompanying text.
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tain a set of principles which, when applied to a core set of fact
situations, accounts for their distribution of outcomes. The objective
account of contract law fails to do this.
Far more descriptive of the actual array of facts are theories of
contract formation based upon mutual assent or the reliance of the
promisee. Actual agreement matters in the law of contracts. Promises
are enforced when the parties have reached an agreement, and are
not enforced when the parties have not actually reached an agree-
ment, unless the promisee actually and reasonably believes that a
promise was made even though none was intended. By the same
token, objective considerations play a role in the decisionmaking pro-
cess. However, what is called an objective theory is better seen as a
rule designed to handle a particular set of cases, embedded in a larger
theory whose basic organizing principle is the actual mutual assent of
the parties. I argue in this Article that these cases reflect a preference
for reliable evidence of actual subjective intent, and act as a species of
estoppel, preventing parties from backing away from the predictable
reliance upon their acts of speech.
With this reconceptualization comes some positive consequences.
For one thing, it allows for added flexibility in the award of contract
remedies. While expectation damages may be an appropriate remedy
for breaches when the parties have reached agreement, full benefit-of-
the-bargain awards may overcompensate promisees, especially when a
promisor inadvertently commits himself, and recognizes the fact
before there has been substantial reliance. 19 Seventy-five years ago,
Professor Whittier made a similar suggestion in his criticism of the
first Restatement.20 Based on a somewhat broader range of data, I
argue here that it is time to resuscitate his analysis.
In addition, once we stop speaking of an objective theory of con-
tract formation, various contract doctrines begin to fit more coher-
ently with one another. Among the advantages are the harmonization
of rules governing the formation and interpretation of contracts; a
significant reduction in the need for peculiar technical definitions of
such common terms as offer, acceptance, agreement; reconciliation of the
objective approach and the requirement of a bargain, which contains
some indispensably subjective elements; and harmonization of the
rules governing contract formation and the rules governing incom-
plete contracts.
19 For discussion of this potential overcompensation, see Daniel Markovits, Con-
tract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1494-96 (2004).
20 Clarke B. Whittier, The Restatement of Contracts and Mutual Assent, 17 CAL. L.
REv. 441, 444-45 (1929).
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Part I of this Article fleshes out the problems that arise with the
objective theory of contract. The argument is a descriptive one: Once
the core scenarios are defined, it quickly becomes clear that the objec-
tive approach fails to account for about half of them. A more subjec-
tive approach-whether based upon mutual assent or upon
reliance-better explains the basic array of facts.
Part II provides two alternative explanations for cases generally
used to justify the objective approach, in which a person is bound by a
statement that he did not intend as a binding promise. First, the rule
serves as a proxy for the actual intent of the parties. Judges articulate
this rationale with great frequency. By accepting the ordinary mean-
ing of the words used as the intended meaning, courts are likely to
capture the intended meaning most of the time, since that is how the
words are most typically used and understood. The second justifica-
tion for the rule disallowing unexpressed subjective evidence of intent
is that such a rule serves as an estoppel to protect reliance interests. If
an individual makes a statement that (1) a reasonable person would
construe as a promise and (2) the promisee actually understands as a
promise in the context of a bargained-for exchange, then the prom-
isor may not assert that he did not intend to bind himself. I call this
principle formation estoppel.2 1
Part III discusses some of the consequences of a subjective
account for contract formation. First, the subjective account permits
more flexibility in the conceptualization of contract remedies. Expec-
tation damages may not be appropriate when the promisor did not
intend to bind himself and the promisee has not acted in reliance.
Second, the subjective account brings the formation of contracts into
harmony with the rules governing contract interpretation, considera-
tion, and gap-filling. The result is a far more coherent account of
contract law generally. Part IV is a brief conclusion.
I. APPRECIATING THE SUBJECTIVE NATURE OF CONTRACT FORMATION
A. How the Objective Account Does Not Do Enough Work
Let us develop with more care the scenarios mentioned in the
introduction. The objective approach to contract law focuses on the
situation in which an individual said something that is most reasona-
bly construed as a promise, but which he did not intend that way. A
21 Formation estoppel differs from promissory estoppel in that it does not require
that the promisee act or refrain from acting in reliance on the promise. It requires
only that the promisee reasonably understood the promisor to have committed him-
self to his word. For discussion of the differences, see infra Part III.A.
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classic example is the 1907 case, Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry
Goods Co.22 Embry was in charge of the sample department for a dry
goods company.28 He had been employed pursuant to a series of one-
year contracts. 24 During the busy Christmas season, he demanded a
renewal and said he would quit if it were not granted. 25 According to
Embry, his superior, McKittrick, responded by saying: "Go ahead,
you're all right. Get your men out, and don't let that worry you."2 6
McKittrick testified that he never intended this statement to be under-
stood as a commitment.2 7 The appellate court, following a trial in
which a jury was instructed that mutual assent was required for an
agreement to be formed, held that mutual assent is not necessary to
bind an individual when a reasonable person would understand a
statement as a promise:
Judicial opinion and elementary treatises abound in statements
of the rule that to constitute a contract there must be a meeting of
the minds of the parties, and both must agree to the same thing in
the same sense. Generally speaking, this may be true; but it is not
literally or universally true. That is to say, the inner intention of
parties to a conversation subsequently alleged to create a contract
cannot either make a contract of what transpired, or prevent one
from arising, if the words used were sufficient to constitute a con-
tract. In so far as their intention is an influential element, it is only
such intention as the words or acts of the parties indicate; not one
secretly cherished which is inconsistent with those words or acts. 2 8
This statement of the law, which is by now standard, is what judges
and writers refer to when they speak of the objective theory of
contracts.
Such legal characterization is by no means a relic. In providing
justification for decisions that employ this rule, judges repeatedly
adduce the objective nature of contract formation. For example, in a
recent decision upholding an arbitration clause, the Eighth Circuit in
a diversity case began its analysis by confirming that "'Minnesota fol-
lows the objective theory of contract formation, under which an out-
22 105 S.W. 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1907).
23 Id. at 777.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 778.
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ward manifestation of assent is determinative, rather than a party's
subjective intent.'- 29 Such statements are easy to find.30
In these cases the court assumes, as the court did in Emb/y, that in
most instances mutual assent is a sufficient basis for determining that
a contract has been formed. 31 Situations like this one, however,
demonstrate that our real concern is with the conduct of the parties,
not with the inner workings of their minds. The following table dis-
plays the array of decisions that generates the objective approach:
TABLE 1.
Would a Reasonable Did the Promisor
Person Infer Intend To Make Is There a Binding
a Promise? a Promise? Promise?
Yes Yes Yes
Yes No Yes
As the table shows, the law need not concern itself with the actual
intent of the promisor, once it is established that a reasonable person
would believe that a promise has been made.
Now let us add the remaining two scenarios, in which it is not
reasonable to conclude that the promisor has bound himself. An
29 Asia Pac. Indus. Corp. v. Rainforest Cafr, Inc., 380 F.3d 383, 387 (8th Cir.
2004) (quoting TNT Props., Ltd. v. Tri-Star Developers, LLC, 677 N.W.2d 94, 102
(Minn. Ct. App. 2004)).
30 See, e.g., J.F. McKinney & Assocs. v. Gen. Elec. Inv. Corp., 183 F.3d 619, 622
(7th Cir. 1999) ("Illinois uses an objective theory of contract under which under-
standings and beliefs are effective only if shared."); see also NBC Universal, Inc. v. Pax-
son Commc'ns Corp., No. 650-N, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 56, at *14 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29,
2005) ("Delaware adheres to the 'objective' theory of contracts, i.e. a contract's con-
struction should be that which would be understood by an objective, reasonable third
party."); Barchowsky v. Silver Farms, Inc., 659 A.2d 347, 355 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1995) ("Maryland follows the objective theory of contract interpretation ...
'[C]ontractual intent is determined in accordance with what a reasonable person in
the position of the parties at the time of the agreement would have intended by the
language used.'" (quoting Faulkner v. Am. Cas. Co., 584 A.2d 734, 739 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1991))); Mealand v. E.N.M. Med. Ctr., 33 P.3d 285, 289 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001)
("New Mexico adheres to the objective theory of contracts."); Commonwealth v. Stew-
art, 66 Va. Cir. 135, 154 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2004) ("[O]bjective theory.., controls in Vir-
ginia .... "); Sykes v. Ellenburg Capital Corp., No. 22772-0-I1, 1999 Wash. App. LEXIS
671, at *9 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 1999) ("Washington adheres to the 'objective
theory' of contracts, requiting the court to examine the parties' objective manifesta-
tions rather than their subjective intent."); Givens v. Fowler, 984 P.2d 1092, 1095
(Wyo. 1999) ("In Wyoming, we examine the objective manifestations of the parties'
contractual intent to determine whether a contract was formed.").
31 See, e.g., JF. McKinney & Assocs., 183 F.3d at 622-23.
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objective approach predicts that there should be no obligation,
whether or not the promisor intended the statement as a promise. If
all that matters is what a reasonable person would understand, then
once the statement is declared not reasonably susceptible to interpre-
tation as a commitment, the person making the statement should not
be bound.
But this inference from the objective theory does not accurately
describe the facts. At least when the promisor intends the statement
as a promise and the promisee understands it that way, a promise will
be enforced, notwithstanding objective considerations. To see this,
we need to consider not only scenarios in which the intent of the
promisor is varied systematically, but also scenarios in which the
understanding of the promisee is varied. 32
Once we take the promisee into account, the array of possible
scenarios expands to eight:
TABLE 2.
Reasonable Promisor's Promisee's Promisor
Inference Intent Understanding [ Bound?
1. Yes Yes Yes Yes
2. Yes Yes No No
3. Yes No Yes Yes (Hotchkiss)
4. No Yes Yes No
5. No Yes Yes Yes
6. No Yes No No
7. No No Yes No
8. No No No No
A purely objective theory would predict that a contract is formed
in all of the first four situations, and only in those situations. But this
is not the case. Rather, with the exception of the Hotchkiss/Emty sce-
nario (Scenario 3), a binding commitment occurs if and only if the
parties are in accord. Alternatively, apart from Scenario 7, it is possi-
32 Speech Act Theory describes these perspectives on the same act of speech as a
matter of "illocutionary force" on the one hand, and "perlocutionary effect," on the
other. Loosely, the former characterizes the speaker's intent, the latter the hearer's
understanding. Many legally relevant speech acts require analysis from both perspec-
tives. For example, fraud requires scienter on behalf of the defendant, and both rea-
sonable and actual reliance on behalf of the plaintiff. The seminal work is J.L.
AuSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O. Urmson & Marian Sbis. eds., 2d ed.
1975).
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ble to say that a promise will be enforced if and only if the promisee
actually construes the promisor's statement as a promise.3 3 Scenario 7
shows that this reliance must be not only actual, but also reasonable,
preventing promisors from being victimized by fraudulent claims of
reliance.
As noted in the introduction, these facts are highly consistent
with a theory of contract law based on notions of personal autonomy.
But it is not the autonomy of the promisor alone that predicts judicial
outcomes in a wide range of cases.3 4 Rather, courts are concerned
with protecting the autonomy of both parties. The exception
reflected in Scenario 3 prevents promisors from walking away from
actual commitments, and uses "reasonableness" as a tiebreaker when
the autonomy interests of the two parties are in actual conflict. Let us
look more closely at this array of situations.
1. Cases in Which Both Parties Agree-One Way or the Other
The first scenario describes a situation where both parties reason-
ably believe the promisor to be bound as part of a bargained-for
exchange. And he is. This situation describes the prototypical con-
tract: the parties make a deal, it looks like a deal, and they know that
they made a deal. These are the transactions that form the core of
contract law. Their formation is typically not the subject of litigation
because the formation of a contract is so obvious that it is beyond
dispute.
The last scenario describes a situation in which neither party
believes the promisor to be bound, and such a belief would be unrea-
sonable. She is not bound. This scenario includes a wide range of
situations, including those in which no one would construe a conver-
sation as including a promise (most of everyday life), and cases in
which both parties understood agreement-type language not to consti-
tute a deal. Such situations include jokes mutually understood as
such, as well as the law professor who hypothetically offers to sell her
car to a student to illustrate a principle of law.
The fourth and fifth scenarios make my point most strongly.
When two people reach an agreement, it is enforceable, regardless of
how a reasonable person would understand the interaction. Learned
Hand made this point himself in Hotchkiss. Following the language
quoted at the beginning of this Article, 35 Hand continued: "Of course,
if it appear by other words, or acts, of the parties, that they attribute a
33 I am grateful to Michael Cahill, who first pointed this possibility out to me.
34 Contrast this position with that of FRIED, supra note 2, at 16.
35 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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peculiar meaning to such words as they use in the contract, that mean-
ing will prevail, but only by virtue of the other words, and not because
of their unexpressed intent."3 6 Judge Easterbrook stated this proposi-
tion colorfully with a watermelon metaphor:
Under the prevailing will theory of contract, parties, like
Humpty Dumpty, may use words as they please. If they wish the
symbols "one Caterpillar D9G tractor" to mean "500 railroad cars
full of watermelons," that's fine-provided parties share this weird
meaning. A meaning held by one party only may not be invoked to
change the ordinary denotation of a word, however. Intent must be
mutual to be effective; unilateral intent does not count. Still less
may the parties announce that they "share" an unusual meaning to
the detriment of strangers, who have no way of finding out what was
in the contracting parties' heads. 37
Or consider this statement from Berke Moore Co. v. Phoenix Bridge
Co.,38 a well-cited New Hampshire case:
The rule which precludes the use of the understanding of one party
alone is designed to prevent imposition of his private understand-
ing upon the other party to a bilateral transaction. But when it
appears that the understanding of one is the understanding of both,
no violation of the rule results from determination of the mutual
understanding according to that of one alone.
Where the understanding is mutual, it ceases to be the "pri-
vate" understanding of one party. 39
The Supreme Court of Arizona makes this point clearly. After
describing various versions of the parol evidence rule, the court made
the following observation:
When interpreting a contract ... it is fundamental that a court
attempt to "ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties
at the time the contract was made if at all possible." If, for example,
parties use language that is mutually intended to have a special
meaning, and that meaning is proved by credible evidence, a court
is obligated to enforce the agreement according to the parties'
intent, even if the language ordinarily might mean something
different. 40
36 Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
37 TKO Equip. Co. v. C & G Coal Co., 863 F.2d 541, 545 (7th Cir. 1988) (citation
omitted).
38 98 A.2d 150 (N.H. 1953).
39 Id. at 156 (citation omitted).
40 Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 854 P.2d 1134, 1139 (Ariz. 1993)
(quoting Polk v. Koerner, 553 P.2d 660, 662 (Ariz. 1975) (citation omitted)).
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Scholars who espouse an objective approach recognize that evi-
dence of the parties' actual intent can trump ordinary meaning in the
interpretation of contracts. Professor Barnett, for example, notes that
when it is clear that the parties actually have their own shared mean-
ing of contractual language, a court should enforce the contract
according to that meaning:
[T]he purpose for which we adopt the objective approach-to
enable persons to rely on the appearances created by others
because subjective intentions are generally inaccessible-is satisfied
by actual knowledge that the appearances in this case are deceiving.
Therefore, in contract law, we protect a party's reliance on objective
appearances, unless it can be shown that the parties shared a com-
mon subjective understanding of the term. 4 1
Professor Barnett would thus treat ordinary meaning as a default rule
for ascertaining the intent of the parties. I agree with this position:
the legal system concerns itself principally with the actual intent of the
parties and uses ordinary understanding as a surrogate for that intent
unless there exists better evidence taken from the transaction itself.
But I characterize these facts quite differently. It is not that contract
law is about appearances but suspends its concern with the objective
just when it happens that the parties have actually agreed. Rather it is
the opposite: the business of contract law is to enforce agreements.
To prevent people from walking away from their agreements, the law
also enforces apparent commitments that a promisee has reasonably
taken seriously. Professor Farnsworth also acknowledges that "[i]n
the rare cases of a common meaning shared by both parties, the sub-
jectivists have had the better argument," although he seems to dismiss
these cases because of their rarity.4 2
The flip side also holds. If neither the promisor nor the prom-
isee believes that agreement has been reached on terms that a reason-
able person may infer from the language of a contract, a court will not
impose an agreement simply because the language is subject to such
an interpretation. 43 Although the first Restatement suggested that
imposing contractual obligations in these circumstances was proper,44
41 Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78
VA. L. REv. 821, 858-59 (1992).
42 FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 7.9, at 448.
43 Actually, I've overstated this point. In cases involving the parol evidence rule, a
court may not concern itself with questions of either party's state of mind, which may
allow such contracts to be enforced, notwithstanding that neither party had any intent
with respect to particular terms. In such cases, it can be said that the parties at the
very least intended to be bound by the contract as a whole.
44 RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcTs § 230 cmt. b (1932).
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Corbin's position, that to do so would be "to hold justice up to ridi-
cule," 45 better characterizes actual practice.
Justice Linde makes the point this way: "IT]he staunchest objec-
tivist would not let ajury hold two parties to an apparently manifested
agreement if neither thought the other meant to assent."46 Similarly,
the Second Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment based on
language that appeared to show that agreement had been reached on
a time limit for bringing a claim but whose meaning was placed in
doubt by the circumstances. The court observed: "There is nothing in
the law of contracts that prevents the parties from ascribing an
uncommon meaning to their words."4 7 When it appears that has hap-
pened, actual intent trumps ordinary understanding.
Cardozo made a similar observation, in connection with the
application of the parol evidence rule. 48 Given a choice between the
most natural reading that neither party intended, or the actual mean-
ing to which the parties had subscribed, it is the latter interpretation
that courts will impose when a dispute arises:
We may concede that the words, when viewed alone, apart from the
setting of the occasion, give support to the defense....
The proper legal meaning, however, is not always the meaning
of the parties. Surrounding circumstances may stamp upon a con-
tract a popular or looser meaning .... The triers of the facts must
fix the sense in which the words were used in the contract now
before us. To take the primary or strict meaning is to make the
whole transaction futile. To take the secondary or loose meaning, is
to give it efficacy and purpose. In such a situation, the genesis and
aim of the transaction may rightly guide our choice. 49
Thus, courts do not regard their function as imposing on parties
terms to which neither agreed when the contract was formed. It may,
of course, happen from time to time. It happens when the parties did
not agree to terms that now appear to be the most reasonable inter-
pretation of a contract, and the party who would be most advantaged
by the enforcement of the contract testifies self-servingly that she
always intended to gain the advantage that the contract appears to
45 3 CORBIN, supra note 7, § 539, at 81. Corbin also expressed the same idea, "No
contract should ever be interpreted and enforced with a meaning that neither party
gave it." Id. § 572B, at 66.
46 Kabil Devs. Corp. v. Mignot, 566 P.2d 505, 509 (Or. 1977).
47 Garza v. Marine Transp. Lines, Inc., 861 F.2d 23, 27 n.4 (2d Cir. 1988).
48 Utica City Nat'l Bank v. Gunn, 118 N.E. 607, 608 (N.Y. 1918).
49 Id. (citation omitted).
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give her.50 Such a person may be able to benefit from the combina-
tion of the rule in Embry and the parol evidence rule, if it is applied to
preclude the other party from offering evidence to the contrary.5
But this shows only that evidentiary rules, designed to reduce the over-
all rate of error in the legal system, do not accomplish this goal in
every case. It would be rare indeed, however, for a judge to state, in
keeping with the First Restatement,52 that the objective theory
requires the court to thwart the known will of the parties and enforce
a deal that both sides concede was never made and that the judge
believes was never made. Courts certainly differ as to how to draw the
line with respect to the admission of evidence that appears to be at
odds with the contract's ordinary meaning. But the overall endeavor
is generally seen as intentional in nature.
This is especially true when one party claims that a contract
should be reasonably implied from the circumstances, but the facts
affirmatively show that no agreement was actually reached. That hap-
pened in Bailey v. West.53 West bought a racehorse from a Dr.
Strauss.54 When the horse arrived in Boston, West claimed it was
lame, and ordered it returned to Dr. Strauss.55 But Dr. Strauss would.
not accept the horse.56 Ultimately, West's trainer had the horse deliv-
ered to Bailey's farm for boarding. 57 When West refused to pay, Bai-
ley sued. 58 Reversing the holding below, the appellate court refused
to imply a contract.59 Even though the circumstances might lead to a
50 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 1107, 1124-26 (1984), for a discussion. Similarly, Barnett recognizes that under
these circumstances, "the objective interpretation of a party's acts will yield ... to
proof of a different subjective understanding of one or both parties." Randy E. Bar-
nett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 307 (1986).
51 The risk of such a result is what has led to a softening of the parol evidence
rule over the decades. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-202(1) (a) (2004) (stating a relaxed parol
evidence rule that generally permits evidence of course of dealing or usage of trade to
explain conduct inconsistent with the contract's clear language); Eric A. Posner, The
Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation,
146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 534 (1998). For a good illustration in the context of the UCC,
see American Machine & Tool Co. v. Strite-Anderson Manufacturing Co., 353 N.W.2d 592,
596-98 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
52 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
53 249 A.2d 414, 416-17 (R.I. 1969). My thanks to Ian Ayres for bringing this case
to my attention.
54 Id. at 415.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 416.
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reasonable inference that a contract had been formed, the trainer had
made it clear to the driver who delivered the horse that West was not
going to pay for the boarding, and West had refused to pay any bills in
the interim. 6 0 It made no difference that West had lost his lawsuit
with Dr. Strauss and had to pay for the horse. 61 West never agreed to
pay for its boarding and maintenance. The court concluded: "From
our examination of the record we are constrained to conclude that
the trial justice overlooked and misconceived material evidence which
establishes beyond question that there never existed between the par-
ties an element essential to the formulation of any true contract,
namely, an 'intent to contract.' 62 Because Bailey was on actual notice
right from the beginning that West was not willing to pay for his ser-
vices, the question of objective consideration never arose. 63
2. When the Promisor Denies Intending To Be Bound
Next, compare the third and seventh scenarios, in which the
promisor denies intending to be bound, but the promisee believes
that a promise has been made. Scenario three is Embiy itself. A per-
son who makes a statement that induces a reasonable person to
believe that the communicator intended to be bound has bound him-
self, regardless of his unexpressed intent not to do so. 64 Professor
Barnett comments on the risks of relying on subjective intent in such
situations:
Such a strategy might create a de facto option in the promisor. The
promisor could insist on enforcement if the contract continued to
be in her interest, but if it were no longer advantageous, she could
avoid the contract, by producing evidence of a differing subjective
intent.
Because the subjective approach relies on evidence inaccessible
to the promisee, much less to third parties, an inquiry into subjec-
tive intent would undermine the security of transactions by greatly
reducing the reliability of contractual commitments. 65
At the extreme, unexpressed intent includes the thoughts of peo-
ple who privately have the same idea, but have never communicated
anything to each other. If you and I both think that it would be a
60 Id. at 415.
61 Id. at 415-16.
62 Id. at 417.
63 See id.
64 Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777, 778-79 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1907).
65 Barnett, supra note 50, at 273.
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good idea for me to sell you a set of golf clubs for $100, we share a
state of mind, but do not have a contract. As Professor Barnett points
out, such cases make a pure will theory of contract untenable. 66
But these concerns, also expressed by Judge Hand in Hotchkiss,67
and by Holmes in The Path of the Law,68 are really quite limited in their
applicability. For contract law typically involves the enforcement of
acts that are themselves communicative in nature: offers, acceptances,
bargained-for exchanges, and promises (whether for consideration or
not). These speech acts, as I argue below, all contain inferences of
the speaker's intent.69 The objective rule in these cases protects
against fraudulent conduct and acts as a default when a misunder-
standing has occurred. Rules that prefer objective evidence of a
party's intent are not motivated by fear that courts will begin enforc-
ing the unexpressed thoughts of people with similar ideas. Rather,
the concern is that parties will try to walk away from commitments
that they have made, or that they will try to expand the scope of a
commitment made by the other party. In both cases, the system bene-
fits by requiring some contemporaneous evidence of what the deal
really was at the time it was made.
The seventh scenario differs from Embry only in that it was not
reasonable for a hearer to construe the promisor's statement as a
commitment. This scenario describes cases in which the statement is
claimed to be a joke. 70 A well-studied example is Leonard v. Pepsico,
Inc. 71 A Pepsi promotional campaign offered various items, such as t-
shirts, in exchange for coupons ("Pepsi Points") that could be accu-
mulated by buying Pepsi products. As a joke at the end of a television
ad, a jet plane landed in a school yard with a statement that the jet
could be purchased for seven million points.72 A lawyer (Leonard)
read the catalogue containing the promotion's rules, and saw that the
Pepsi Points program permitted participants to use cash to purchase
the items at the price of ten cents for each required point, as long as
at least fifteen actual coupon points were submitted as part of the
deal. This would mean that the jet could be purchased for $700,000.
66 Id. at 302-03.
67 Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
68 O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 464 (1897).
69 See infra Part I1I.D.
70 For discussion of such cases, see Keith A. Rowley, You Asked for It, You Got It...
Toy Yoda: Practical Jokes, Prizes and Contract Law, 3 NEV. L.J. 526, 527-30, 536-38,
546-52, 554 (2003).
71 210 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
72 Id. at 89.
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The retail value of the vehicle was some $23 million. 73 When Leonard
tried to take advantage of the situation, the court held that no reason-
able person would take the offer as anything other than a cute joke,
and did not enforce the deal as it appeared on television.
7 4
Embry and Pepsico differ in whether it was reasonable for the
hearer to take the promisor seriously. In Pepsico, the objective rule
does not apply to make the promise enforceable, since the promisee
cannot have reasonably relied upon the promisor's words in accepting
the offer. Yet the state of the promisor's mind is not totally irrelevant.
Had the evidence shown that Pepsico was dead serious about this offer
(perhaps discovery revealed substantial files planning a ceremony to
celebrate the redemption of coupons for the jet), it is likely that a
court would have required the company to live up to the promise it
made in its advertising campaign.
In fact, a situation very much on point arose in Newman v. Schiff
7 5
a case decided by the Eighth Circuit in 1985. Schiff was a tax rebel
who claimed that the federal income tax is optional as a legal mat-
ter.76 On a CBS news program, he made the following offer: "If any-
body calls this show-I have the Code-and cites any section of this
Code that says an individual is required to file a tax return, I will pay
them $100,000."7 7 Newman, a lawyer, did not see the original broad-
cast. But he did see the interview-including the offer-when it was
rebroadcast on the morning news the next day. 78 Newman found sec-
tions of the Internal Revenue Code that appeared to demonstrate that
taxes must be paid, and contacted CBS both by phone and in writing
the following day.7 9 Schiff responded that others had already pointed
out the same Code provisions, that they were not adequate to earn the
reward, and that Newman had not properly accepted the offer.
8 0
Newman sued. The district court ruled in favor of Schiff, holding that
the offer actually was intended to expire at the end of the original
broadcast."' Although the offer was later extended to the subsequent
73 Leonard v. Pepsico, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 116, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
74 Leonard, 210 F.3d at 88-89.
75 778 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1985). The case is discussed by Professor Rowley, supra
note 70, at 549-50.
76 Newman, 778 F.2d at 461.
77 Id. at 462.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 462-63.
80 Id. at 463 n.6.
81 Id. at 463.
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broadcast by Schiffs various acts of ratification, the court found that
Newman had not accepted that renewed offer in a timely way either.8 2
The Eighth Circuit affirmed on somewhat different grounds.
The appellate court first ruled that the key issue was whether a reason-
able person in Newman's position would take the next day's rebroad-
cast of Schiff's offer as a bona fide offer of a reward. The court held
that it would not be reasonable to do so.8 3 But the court then went on
to consider the subsequent correspondence between Schiff and New-
man, and how it might impact the status of Schiff's offer. Somewhat
inconsistently, the court wrote:
Here, in Schiff's letter, we have a statement indicating that the
rebroadcast may have been an offer. If Schiff believed that the
rebroadcast was an offer, then that belief would tend to make it
appear more reasonable for Newman to have reached the same con-
clusion. We note, however, that both Schiff's conduct and his letter
are indefinite. He still denied the obligation. Schiff's conduct and
correspondence do not change the facts that the rebroadcast was
merely a newsreport and that it was not reasonable for the hearer to
construe the newsreport as a new offer.8 4
Thus, if Schiff had actually admitted with some clarity that he
intended the offer to remain open through the rebroadcast, the court
would have enforced the parties' mutual intent. For had Schiff made
it clear that he intended to extend the offer through the rebroadcast,
the deal would have been enforceable precisely because the two par-
ties would have been in accord in their actual interpretation of the
events, regardless of the fact that on its face it would not seem reason-
able to construe the offer on live television as extended to the next
morning's report of it. Such cases are not commonplace, but they
occur from time to time.8 5
82 See id. at 461-66.
83 Id. at 466 ("A reasonable person listening to the news rebroadcast could not
conclude that the above language-'calls this show'-constituted a new offer; rather
than what it actually was, a newsreport of the offer previously made, which had
already expired.").
84 Id. at 466-67.
85 For examples, see Rowley, supra note 70, at 539-43, 546. The title of Rowley's
article refers to Beny v. Gulf Coast Wings, Inc., No. 01-2642 (Fla. 14th Cir. Ct. filed July
24, 2001). In Berry, a waitress at a Hooters restaurant alleged that she was promised a
new Toyota for job performance, but was given a new "toy Yoda" instead. See Initial
Complaint at 1-3, Berry v. Gulf Coast Wings, Inc., No. 01-2642 (Fla. 14th Cir. Ct.July
24, 2001), available at http: / / news.corporate.findlaw.com /hdocs/docs/hooters/berry
gcw72401cmp.pdf. The article's title also refers to Gill v. Cumulus Media, Inc., No. 05-
CI-2740 (Fayette Cir. Ct. filedJune 22, 2005). In Gill, the plaintiff alleged that a radio
advertisement promised "100 Grand," but gave her a candy bar with that name
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3. When the Promisor Intends To Be Bound, but the Promisee
Does Not Understand that a Commitment Has Been Made
In two scenarios (two and six), the promisor intends to be bound,
but the promisee does not construe the promisor's statement as a
binding promise. Consider a variation of the facts in Embry, based on
a hypothetical by Professor Eisenberg 6 : Assume that McKittrick
intended to be bound when he said, "Go ahead, you're all right. Get
your men out, and don't let that worry you."'87 Assume further that
Embry did not believe that statement to be a real commitment. Per-
haps he responded, "Mr. McKittrick, when are you going to give me a
direct answer on which I can rely?" He then told a number of wit-
nesses (perhaps twenty bishops) that he would stay for as long as he
wished and then leave, since he did not consider McKittrick to have
made a real promise. If Embry continued working for the company
for a few months and was later dismissed, would the company be
bound by McKittrick's statement?
It is difficult to regard such a promise as binding. Most signifi-
candy, it cannot be part of a bargained-for exchange, 88 since the party
to receive the benefit of the promise did not understand the bargain
as including the promise in the first place. Nor can liability be based
on promissory estoppel, since there cannot possibly be detrimental
reliance on a promise when the recipient does not believe that a
promise has been made. Obviously, the situation does not arise often,
since a promisee who wishes to enforce a promise is unlikely to
acknowledge that he had no idea that there ever was a promise.
instead of the money she expected. See Complaint at 1-2, Gill v. Cumulus Media,
Inc., No. 05-CI-2740 (Fayette Cir. Ct. June 22, 2005), available at http://www.thesmok-
inggun.com/archive/0623051grand1.html. Thanks to Professor Ronald Chen for
bringing this matter to my attention through the contract professors listserve. Closer
to home for legal academics, Professor Alan Dershowitz raised a stir when he prom-
ised on MSNBC's Scarborough Country: "Tell you what. I will give $10,000 to the P.L.O.
in your name if you can find a historical fact in my book that you can prove to be
false." Scarborough Country (MSNBC television broadcast Sept. 8, 2003). On a subse-
quent radio program, Democracy Now, Norman Finkelstein claimed to have found vari-
ous erroneous statements; Dershowitz claimed that his offer was limited to a
"material, willful, distortion." Democracy Now (NPR radio broadcast Sept. 24, 2003)
(transcript available at http://www.democracynow.org/static/dershowitzFin.shtml).
To the best of my knowledge, this offer has not resulted in litigation.
86 Eisenberg, supra note 50, at 1124-26.
87 See Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777, 777 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1907).
88 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981) (defining
consideration).
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For our purposes, it is relevant that the reasonableness of the
promise does not seem to have anything to do with the analysis. If the
purpose of the objective rule is to prevent the promisor from denying
intent when his actions appear to speak for themselves, there is no
need to apply the rule when he admits his intent to be bound as an
initial matter. The analysis is exactly the same regardless of whether
the promisor's statement, seen objectively, is reasonably construed by
third parties as a commitment.
Moreover, as the hypothetical illustrates, the promisee's state of
mind does not mean that she believes in the promisor's sincerity. As
discussed below, promises need not be sincere to be enforceable. 89 In
fact, insincere promises are not only actionable as a breach of contract
if not performed, but are also fraudulent. 90 I may believe that I am
dealing with a liar when a car dealer tells me that the car I am inter-
ested in buying has only 10,000 miles, but that liar will be bound as
long as I understand his statement as a promise.
As for our hypothetical Mr. Embry, courts often reject an
employee's effort to enforce an employer's promises when it does not
appear that the employee accepted the employer's offer as part of a
bargained-for exchange. As the Supreme Court of Maryland has
stated,
There is no enforceable contractual obligation created when an
employer offers an employee a bonus for doing that which the
employee is already required to do. Without consideration, in the
form of a promise to continue to work, the promise to pay addi-
tional fees for sales that previously were required is not part of any
valid contract. 91
Similarly, an employer's request that an employee give up rights-
even the rights of an at-will employee-also requires consideration to
be enforceable. 92
Situations in which the promisor intends to bind himself but the
promisee does not understand that a commitment has been made are
by no means limited to employment situations. The principle applies
generally. Consider Professor Farnsworth's hypothetical concerning
the enforceability of rewards, based on a 1907 Texas case 93 :
89 See infra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
90 For detailed analytical discussion, see IAN AvREs & GREGORY KLASS, INSINCERE
PROMISES 143-45 (2005).
91 Medex v. McCabe, 811 A.2d 297, 305-06 (Md. 2002) (citation omitted).
92 See Poole v. Incentives Unlimited, Inc., 525 S.E.2d 898, 900 (S.C. Ct. App.
1999) (holding that a covenant not to compete, signed after employment com-
menced, but without new consideration, was invalid).
93 Broadnax v. Ledbetter, 99 S.W. 1111 (Tex. 1907).
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Suppose that an owner advertises a $100 reward for the return of a
lost gold watch. If a finder of the watch, having read the advertise-
ment, returns the watch to the owner, this action is bargained for,
and the finder can enforce the owner's promise of a reward. But if
the finder, unaware of the promise, notices the owner's name
engraved on the watch and returns it, the action could not have
been bargained for. Since the finder did not know of the owner's
promise, the action could not have been given in exchange for it.
The finder cannot, therefore, enforce the owner's promise.94
Although bargained-for exchanges surely do not constitute the only
enforceable obligations, as critics of the bargain theory of contract
have pointed out for many years,95 in these cases the principle applies
well. Most significantly, once the promisor does not deny having
made a commitment, objective analysis of her intent becomes irrele-
vant to the analysis of contract formation, and in fact makes incorrect
predictions.
B. The Stamina of the Objective Theory
Whatever the value of the objective account of contract law, it
surely does not create a coherent picture of a basic array of cases. It
incorrectly predicts the enforceability of statements that neither party
would regard as binding, and incorrectly fails to predict the enforce-
ability of statements that both parties would regard as binding. These
are more than "subjective elements" of an objective contracts regime.
They are core cases. A theory of contract formation should surely be
good enough to account for eight basic scenarios. Accepting these
failures as "limits" of the prevailing theory is not a very satisfactory
solution, not only because the cases are so central, but also because
there is nothing about the theory that suggests that such limits should
exist.
It is natural enough to discount the reasoning of my argument
because so much of it relies upon cases that seldom occur, if at all.
However, such an objection does not undermine my point. In fact, it
explains why it is that we live so easily with the objective account of
contract law notwithstanding its descriptive inadequacy.
94 FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 2.10, at 68; see also CORBIN, supra note 7, § 3.5, at
326-30 ("There is no power of acceptance by one to whom the offer is wholly
unknown.").
95 For discussion of the history of the tension between bargain-based theories and
reliance-based theories of contract, see ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CON-
TRACT LAw 7-77 (1998); Barnett, supra note 50, at 287-89; Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing
Reliance: The Perils of Promissoiy Estoppel, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1228-29 (1998).
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One reason for the longevity of the objective theory is cognitive
in nature. We tend to reason from what we actually notice. Our reli-
ance upon what is actually in front of us is a well-studied phenomenon
in the psychology of reasoning. Psychologists speak of an "availability
heuristic," which causes people to overestimate the probability of
those events that are salient in their lives.96 If we regard contract for-
mation as objective, we can describe accurately the few scenarios that
recur. With respect to those, it is as if there really is an objective the-
ory. However, application of this strategy leads to errors in predicting
the results both in non-salient cases and in the overall structure of our
judgments.
This point can be made even more strongly. As the psychologist
Philip N. Johnson-Laird has demonstrated, people often draw infer-
ences from what actually occurs, ignoring situations that do not
arise.97 He calls this the "principle of truth."98  This principle
explains, for example, how it is that people are so prone to infer cau-
sation based only on evidence of co-occurrence. Inferences of causa-
tion actually require one to consider, hypothetically, situations in
which there is no observed co-occurrence.99 It is difficult for people
to remove themselves from the reality they perceive, leading to errors
in inference. 100
Adherence to the objective approach to contract law is a proto-
typical instance of the application of this strategy. The appeal of the
objective approach emanates from its power to explain cases like
Embry, and to contrast them with cases like Pepsico. The focus in all
such cases is on the state of mind of the promisor, who has denied
that any commitment was intended. Thus, it appears that this is the
only relevant consideration. More generally, common law reasoning
itself may well increase the likelihood of mischaracterizing the system
of contract law, because it has developed from case-by-case decision-
making followed by post hoc analysis, rather than as a coherent system
ab initio. 10 There is little intellectual pressure to identify the cases
96 See RicHARD NISnETT & LEE Ross, HuMAN INFERENCE 18-23 (1980); Amos Tver-
sky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, inJUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY 3, 11-14 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
97 P.N. Johnson-Laird, Causation, Mental Models, and the Law, 65 BROOK. L. REV.
67, 69-80 (1999).
98 Id. at 71.
99 Id. at 80-83.
100 Others have also noted that the availability of information can lead to errors in
judgment about causality. See, e.g., NISBETT & Ross, supra note 96, at 22-23.
101 For recent discussion of such problems, see Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make
Bad Law?, 73 U. CI. L. REV. 883, 890-99 (2006).
[VOL. 83:1
CONTRACT AS AGREEMENT
that do not arise, but which can teach us a great deal about the struc-
ture of our thinking.
Increasing the saliency of cases employing the objective approach
are the socio-legal circumstances in which the objective theory gained
its prominence. As Professor Rakoff has noted, the rise of the corpo-
ration as a contracting party made it more difficult to attribute intent
to any individual. 10 2 Moreover, the standardization of business trans-
actions, often involving the repeated use of forms, made it more
attractive to rely upon ordinary interpretations. 10 3 This approach
culminated in the Uniform Commercial Code's focus on such con-
cepts as trade usage and course of dealing.10 4 These developments
made it intellectually attractive to focus attention on those cases in
which courts subordinated a party's intent to the understanding of a
reasonable person.
The argument presented here is akin to that of Calabresi and
Melamed in their famous study of nuisance law. 10 5 In describing the
possible outcomes of disputes over whether one party may interfere
with another in the use of property, they conceptualized the situation
in terms of a matrix.1 0 6 The variables are who wins (plaintiff or defen-
dant) and how the winning party wins (enforcement of superior prop-
erty rights through injunction or the payment of damages, which
allows the interference to continue for a price)."' 7 Among possibili-
ties is a peculiar-looking one: the defendant must stop engaging in the
nuisance, but the plaintiff must pay for the cost of the cessation. 0 8
The scenario makes little sense in our winner-take-all conceptualiza-
tion of the legal system, but the very year that Calabresi and Melamed
published their article, the Supreme Court of Arizona decided Spur
Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co. 10 9 A feed lot was creating
a nuisance because it was too close to a development. 10 But the feed
lot was there first, and the developer had "come to the nuisance."1 "'
The result was that the court required the feed lot to move (enforcing
102 Rakoff, supra note 13, at 80-81.
103 Id. at 81.
104 U.C.C. § 2-202(a) (2006).
105 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Ina-
lienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1115-24 (1972). I am very
grateful to David Reiss for pointing out the similarities in the structure of the
arguments.
106 Id. at 1105-15.
107 Id. at 1089-93.
108 Id. at 1105-10.
109 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972).
110 Id. at 704-05.
111 Id. at 707.
2007]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
the property rights of the development), but also required the devel-
oper to pay for the move (imposing a liability rule on the party that
seemed to win). 112
Similarly, our conceptualization of contract formation changes
when we look not only at the most recurrent cases, but at how we
would resolve the entire matrix of possible scenarios that is generated
when we take into account the few variables that seem to influence
courts in the recurrent cases. As a descriptive matter, it appears from
our eight scenarios that promises are typically enforced when there is
mutual assent and they are not enforced when there is not mutual
assent. We turn in the next Part to the exceptions to this generaliza-
tion that have led people to think otherwise.
II. Two EXPLANATIONS FOR HOLDING PEOPLE LIABLE FOR
PROMISES THEY DID NOT INTEND To MAKE
I have thus far given reason to question the proposition that we
routinely hold promisors accountable for statements that are reasona-
bly construed as promises whether or not they intend them as such. I
argue that the basic array of contract law appears to prefer subjective
explanation, with the objective principle standing out as an exception
that applies in a particular type of scenario. Once the objective
approach is rejected as a theory, it becomes appropriate to ask whether
there exist alternative explanations consistent with my analysis that
can explain the exception and its longevity. Below, I propose two:
first, the legal system looks at the way a reasonable person would con-
strue a statement as strong evidence of what the speaker intended to
say; second, the system holds speakers responsible only when the
hearer actually construes the statement as a promise. This creates a
choice between protecting the interests of a promisor who has miss-
poken at best and acted dishonestly at worst, and those of an innocent
promisee. The principle, which favors the promisee in these circum-
stances, protects the autonomy of the party not at fault. This very
much resembles other reliance-based doctrines of contract law, such
as promissory estoppel, in which the reliance must be both actual and
reasonable.
A. Objective Evidence of Subjective Intent
One need not rely upon truth tables to observe that contract law
is largely subjective. Even a perfunctory look at cases involving the
interpretation of contracts shows them to be replete with rhetoric
112 See id. at 707-08.
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about the intent of the parties. Over and over again, courts announce
that their job is to determine actual intent.' 13 They often make refer-
ence to a "meeting of the minds"-a theory of contract that has been
declared dead and buried for decades. 1 4 Thus, while judges
announce that they adhere to an objective approach in the cases in
which they refuse to take into consideration the unarticulated intent
of a party that is at odds with the evidentiary record, much of the rest
of the time they speak of intent routinely and without hesitation.
To see what appears to underlie this fact, let us return to Learned
Hand's statement in Hotchkiss. What must be rejected, according to
Hand, is not the notion of intent, but rather, testimony based upon
intent that was unexpressed at the time the contract is alleged to have
been formed." 15 This is the rule that has survived for almost a century
now. In fact, Hand's pronouncement is really nothing more than an
articulation of the "ordinary meaning rule," which has dominated the
interpretation of both contracts and statutes for decades. In the inter-
pretation of contracts, as in the interpretation of statutes,' 16 courts
turn to the ordinary meaning of the terms. Although courts some-
times use the rule as a directive without explaining its motivation, l1 7
often enough a court will note that it is resorting to the ordinary
meaning of a document as the best evidence of intent, whether the
intent of the contracting parties, or the intent of the enacting legisla-
ture.'1 8 The following statement by the Supreme Court of Colorado is
typical:
113 See discussion infra Part III.B.
114 See, e.g., infra note 188.
115 Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
116 Examination of the similarities and differences between the two judicial
endeavors can be instructive. See generally Stephen F. Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Mod-
ern Parol Evidence Rule and Its Implications for New Textualist Statutoy Interpretation, 87
GEO. L.J. 195, 199, 221-42 (1988) (comparing and contrasting "the use of parol evi-
dence in contract interpretation with the use of legislative history in statutory inter-
pretation"); Lawrence M. Solan, Pernicious Ambiguity in Contracts and Statutes, 79 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 859, 860, 866-79 (2004) (discussing problems of ambiguity "in both
statutory and contractual interpretation").
117 See, e.g., DeLoach v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 391 F.3d 551, 558 (4th Cir. 2004)
("Under [North Carolina] law, as under general principles of contract law, our task is
to 'give ordinary words their ordinary meanings.'" (quoting Internet E., Inc. v. Duro
Commc'ns, Inc., 553 S.E.2d 84, 87 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001))); Cantonbury Heights
Condo. Ass'n v. Local Land Dev., L.L.C., 873 A.2d 898, 904 (Conn. 2005) ("We accord
the language employed in the contract a rational construction based on its common,
natural and ordinary meaning and usage as applied to the subject matter of the
contract.").
118 As for the ordinary meaning rule reflecting legislative intent in the interpreta-
tion of statutes, see Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992)
2007]
378 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 83:1
A court's primary goal is to implement the intent of the parties as
expressed in the language of the decree. To ascertain this intent,
the courts turn to the plain and ordinary meaning of its terms. If
the terms are clear, a court will neither look outside the four cor-
ners of the instrument, nor admit extrinsic evidence to aid in
interpretation. 119
Similar statements are easy enough to find.1 20 Perhaps the best illus-
trations of this approach are cases in which the court simultaneously
requires a meeting of the minds and objective evidence, as did the
Supreme Court of Arkansas, holding that "in order to make a contract
there must be a meeting of the minds as to all terms, using objective
indicators.' 1
2 1
Much of the time (including the Colorado case quoted above),
the analysis relates the intent of the parties, the ordinary meaning rule
and the four corners rule, which prohibits a court from looking
outside the contract for the intentions of the parties when the lan-
("The question, at bottom, is one of statutory intent, and we accordingly 'begin with
the language employed by CONcRss and the assumption that the ordinary meaning
of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose."' (quoting FMC Corp. v.
Holliday, 498 U.S. 54, 57 (1990))); Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws:
The Central Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427, 456-57
(2005).
119 City of Golden v. Simpson, 83 P.3d 87, 93 (Colo. 2004) (en banc) (citations
omitted).
120 See, e.g., Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Dixon, 112 P.3d 825, 828 (Idaho 2005)
("The meaning of the insurance policy and the intent of the parties must be deter-
mined from the plain meaning of the insurance policy's own words."); ARYJewelers,
L.L.C. v. Krigel, 82 P.3d 460, 466 (Kan. 2003) ("The cardinal rule in contract interpre-
tation is to ascertain the intention of the parties and to give effect to that inten-
tion.... The intent of the parties is determined based on the contract alone, not on
extrinsic or parol evidence. ... Words should be given their natural and ordinary
meaning." (quoting Armstrong Bus. Servs. v. H & R Block, 96 S.W.3d 867, 874 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2002) (citations omitted))); Batshon v. Mar-Que Gen. Contractors, Inc., 624
N.W.2d 903, 906 n.4 (Mich. 2001) ("If the language of a release is clear and unambig-
uous, the intent of the parties is ascertained from the plain and ordinary meaning of
the language."); Motorsports Racing Plus, Inc. v. Arctic Cat Sales, Inc., 666 N.W.2d
320, 323 (Minn. 2003) ("[T]he primary goal of contract interpretation is to deter-
mine and enforce the intent of the parties. Where the parties express their intent in
unambiguous words, those words are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning."
(citations omitted)).
121 Alltel Corp. v. Sumner, 203 S.W.3d 77, 80 (Ark. 2005); see also Hill-Shafer
P'ship v. Chilson Family Trust, 799 P.2d 810, 814-15 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc) ("It is
well-established that before a binding contract is formed, the parties must mutually
consent to all material terms .... Importantly, however, mutual assent is based on
objective evidence, not on the hidden intent of the parties." (citations omitted));
Avemco Ins. Co. v. N. Colo. Air Charter, 38 P.3d 555, 564 (Colo. 2002) (requiring
"meeting of the minds through objective manifestation of mutual assent").
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guage is clear. Thus, notwithstanding the enormous attention it has
received, the "objective theory of contracts" appears to be a simple-
and sensible enough-rule of evidence which, like the parol evidence
rule and the statute of frauds, is designed to prevent litigating parties
from relying upon testimony of an earlier state of mind without cor-
roborating evidence.
Moreover, ordinary meaning is at its core nothing more than a
statement about the likely intent of the speaker. We take language to
be "plain" just when anyone using that language can mean but one
thing by it. We take one sense of language to be the "ordinary" sense,
just when anyone using that language is likely to have intended that
sense in those circumstances. 12 2 Courts frequently recognize this fact
with statements like: "The intent of the parties is best determined by
the plain language of the contract."' 123 These courts are correct in
recognizing that plain or ordinary language is nothing more than evi-
dence of a drafter's intent. That is the only sense in which meaning
can be plain or ordinary. 124
Scholars have taken note of these evidentiary arguments. Profes-
sor Rakoff explains:
The use of an objective, rather than subjective, approach for
contract interpretation can be understood partly in evidentiary
terms. Parties often intend the very meaning that would be attrib-
uted to their words or acts by an outside observer. It could be
argued that the number of cases in which parties do not mean what
they seem to mean, is smaller than the number of cases in which the
trier of fact will be misled by well rehearsed claims of a spurious
subjective intent. Or it could be argued that when the issue is stated
in subjective terms, the legal system will focus too much on finding
direct evidence-the "smoking gun"-and fail to pay enough atten-
tion to the better evidence provided by the terms of the agreement
itself. Either of these arguments would tend to the conclusion, that
even if the ground of obligation were subjective agreement, the pur-
pose of the law would be better served if stated in objective
terms. 1
25
122 See Solan, supra note 118, at 456-57.
123 United States v. Donovan, 348 F.3d 509, 512 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Pension
Trust Fund for Operating Eng'rs v. Fed. Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 944, 950 (9th Cir. 2002)
(" [T] he best evidence of the parties' intent is the plain language of the policy .... );
In re Osborne, 763 N.E.2d 855, 857 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) ("The language of the marital
agreement is the best indication of the parties' intent.").
124 See NoAM CHOMSKY, NEW HORIZONS IN THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE AND MIND 30
(2000). For discussion of this issue in some detail, see Solan, supra note 116, at
869-71.
125 Rakoff, supra note 13, at 78.
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While Rakoff observes that some doctrines, such as reliance on trade
usage in the Uniform Commercial Code seem to trump actual intent,
such rules may also be seen as default rules that act as proxies for
intent when no better evidence exists.
Judge Posner makes this point:
There is a happy medium, and that is to allow extrinsic ambigu-
ity to be shown only by objective evidence. By "objective," I mean to
exclude a party's self-serving testimony that cannot be verified
because it concerns his state of mind or a conversation to which the
only witness was the other party to the contract, and that party
either denies that the conversation took place or disagrees about
what was said. That there were two ships Peerless which could have
transported the cotton that was the subject of the contract was a
readily verifiable fact, in contrast to the unverifiable assertion of an
interested party. Similarly, dictionaries, articles, treatises, and evi-
dence of custom or trade usage that gives [sic] special meaning to
words that a reader of the contract, ignorant of the trade, might
suppose were being used in their everyday sense are objective
sources of facts because they are not within the parties' control.
Such evidence is harder to fake than parties' testimony concerning
their intentions and understandings and unrecorded, unwitnessed
conversations. The parties' behavior, as distinct from their asser-
tions, at least when it predates the beginning of the controversy and
so is not plausibly regarded as strategic, is also objective in my sense
of the term. 126
The concern of these scholars is the same as that of Judge Hand
in Hotchkiss- the unreliability of testimony reporting a party's unex-
pressed intent. By requiring evidence beyond contested, post hoc
descriptions of the parties' earlier states of mind, the system is able to
increase the reliability of its decisionmaking process.
B. Objectivity as Formation Estoppel
Let us return to Embry, one of the classic illustrations of the objec-
tive approach. A closer look demonstrates that the court concerned
itself with more than the ordinary meaning of McKittrick's words.
Below is the actual holding:
[W]e hold that, though McKittrick may not have intended to
employ Embry by what transpired between them according to the
latter's testimony, yet if what McKittrick said would have been taken
by a reasonable man to be an employment, and Embry so understood
126 Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L.
REv. 1581, 1598-99 (2005).
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it, it constituted a valid contract of employment for the ensuing
year. 12
7
The court specifically relied upon the fact that Embry actually under-
stood McKittrick's words as a commitment in holding that a contract
had been formed. That is, the objective meaning trumps the
speaker's intent when the hearer actually understood it as an ordinary
person would.1 28 Were the recipient's understanding not taken into
account, courts would be holding people responsible for commit-
ments that they did not intend to make and that the recipient did not
regard as a commitment either. Thus the doctrine that a person is
bound to a statement reasonably understood to be a commitment also
has a subjective element: the actual understanding of the hearer.
Other classic cases often used to illustrate the objective theory of
contracts similarly involve actual reliance. Consider Lucy v. Zehmer.129
In that case, W. 0. Lucy visited the Zehmers at their restaurant and
offered to buy their farm for $50,000.130 Having had several drinks
and thinking that Lucy was joking (at least so he claimed in litigation),
Zehmer wrote up a contract.13 ' Lucy then insisted that Mrs. Zehmer,
a co-owner of the farm, sign the agreement as well; Zehmer redrafted
it, changing references from the singular to the plural. 32 Mr.
Zehmer and his wife then both signed the contract of sale.' 33 Lucy
later claimed that to him it was no joke. 34 He had wanted to buy this
farm for a number of years, had made a generous offer, and had actu-
ally gone to the restaurant for the purpose of attempting to effect the
transaction.1 3 5 The court held that Zehmer was bound, since a rea-
sonable person examining the written document would not conclude
that it was a joke. 13 6 But that is not the only reason the court gave:
127 Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777, 779 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1907) (emphasis added).
128 Professor Eisenberg notes this aspect of the holding in Emby: "The appeals
court made clear, however, that the reasonable meaning of McKittrick's expression
was determinative only if Embry's subjective understanding coincided with that mean-
ing." Eisenberg, supra note 50, at 1125.
129 84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954).
130 Id. at 518.
131 Id. at 517-518.
132 Id. at 518.
133 Id. at 519.
134 Id. at 518.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 521 ("In the field of contracts, as generally elsewhere, 'We must look to
the outward expression of a person as manifesting his intention rather than to his
secret and unexpressed intention.'" (quoting First Nat'l Exch. Bank v. Roanoke Oil
Co., 192 S.E. 764, 770 (Va. 1937))).
2007]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
If it be assumed, contrary to what we think the evidence shows,
that Zehmer was jesting about selling his farm to Lucy and that the
transaction was intended by him to be a joke, nevertheless the evi-
dence shows that Lucy did not so understand it but considered it to
be a serious business transaction and the contract to be binding on
the Zehmers as well as on himself. The very next day he arranged
with his brother to put up half the money and take a half interest in
the land. The day after that he employed an attorney to examine
the title. The next night, Tuesday, he was back at Zehmer's place
and there Zehmer told him for the first time, Lucy said, that he
wasn't going to sell and he told Zehmer, 'You know you sold that
place fair and square." After receiving the report from his attorney
that the title was good he wrote to Zehmer that he was ready to
close the deal. 13 7
That is, it mattered to the court that Lucy took the offer seriously, and
actually acted upon it. Had Lucy, too, considered the matter ajoke, it
would have made no difference if a reasonable person hearing the
story might have taken the contract seriously.
This is not to say that the facts fully support the outcome. For
example, the opinion notes that Lucy tried unsuccessfully to give
Zehmer five dollars "to bind the bargain."'138 If Lucy really thought
Zehmer was serious, he might not have felt the need to do so. And, of
course, Lucy may have actually intended the entire episode as a joke,
never guessing that a reasonable person would conclude otherwise.
Whether it reached the best result, the facts that the court considered
relevant are clear enough.
Judges continue to take note of the promisee's state of mind. For
example, in Cobaugh v. Klick-Lewis, Inc.,13 9 a car dealer had posted on
a golf course signage promising a new car to a golfer who hit a hole-in-
one on the ninth hole during a tournament. 40 The dealer forgot to
remove the sign, and when the plaintiff aced the hole the next day,
the dealer refused to deliver.1 4 I The court held that the offer was still
valid, employing the classic objective approach. 142 But it also noted
that "[t] here is no basis for believing that Cobaugh was aware that the
Chevrolet automobile had been intended as a prize only for an earlier
tournament.' 4 3 Presumably, had there been a basis for believing that
137 Id.
138 Id. at 518. My thanks to Ian Ayres for bringing this fact to my attention.
139 561 A.2d 1248 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). I learned of this case from an internet
posting by Professor John Gedid.
140 Id. at 1249.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 1251.
143 Id. at 1250.
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Cobaugh was aware of the dealer's intent to the contrary, the result
would have been different.
The Restatement incorporates the understanding of the prom-
isee into its definition of promise. Section 2 of the Restatement defines
promise "A promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain
from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in
understanding that a commitment has been made. 1 44 The definition
elegantly captures both cases in which the promisor intends to be
bound, and those in which he does not intend to be bound. In addi-
tion, it at least appears to include only those cases in which the prom-
isee actually and justifiably understands that a commitment has been
made. 145 If the promisee does not reasonably understand that a com-
mitment has been made, then there is no promise, no matter what the
promisor intended.
Scholars have observed the relationship between reliance inter-
ests of promisees and rules requiring objective analysis, sometimes
recognizing that the actual state of mind of the promisee cannot be
ignored. Professor Barnett extends his analysis to include the require-
ment that the promisee actually understood the statement as a com-
mitment.1 46 As he explains, a core goal of the "objective theory" of
contract law is the prevention of fraud. 147 This function is well-served
by applying the presumption that the ordinary meaning of a con-
tract's terms was the meaning intended by the parties. However, this
presumption is rebuttable: when the promisor can demonstrate that
the other party did not understand the alleged promise as an instance
of ordinary speech, the likelihood of fraud is reduced, along with the
risk that the integrity of the transaction will be compromised.148 Pro-
fessor Eisenberg makes a similar point, noting that "the more reasona-
ble meaning will prevail only if it is the meaning that one party has
actually attached to the expression." 149 I agree with the conclusions
these scholars reach, but not because these scenarios present excep-
tions to the objective theory of contracts. On the contrary, there is no
contract because the parties have not reached an agreement and the
144 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(1) (1981).
145 It is possible to read this provision as requiring only that the manifestation be
clear enough to allow an inference that a commitment has been made, even if the
promisee does not do so, but courts do not appear to adopt this meaning.
146 Barnett, supra note 41, at 305.
147 Id. at 302.
148 Barnett, supra note 50, at 307-308, 321.
149 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Expression Rules in Contract Law and Problems of Offer and
Acceptance, 82 CAL. L. RE-x. 1127, 1132 (1994).
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hearer's understanding of the situation is not sufficient to trigger for-
mation estoppel.
Other scholars also note the relationship between the objective
approach to contract formation and the significance of reliance inter-
ests, although they do not always discuss the significance of the subjec-
tive understanding of the hearer. 150 Often, they write about the
benefits of the objective theory in protecting the security of transac-
tions. 151 But the only reason for protecting the security of a transac-
tion in this context is to protect the reliance interests of the promisee,
and the promisee has no reliance interest if she did not believe that
she had received a promise. Implicitly, then, the actual understand-
ing of the promisee plays a role in these analyses as well. Further-
more, by taking the actual goals of both parties seriously, the law
recognizes the autonomy of both parties to a transaction.
To summarize, the standard objective approach to contract for-
mation is off-base. The very same facts concerning what does and
does not count as a contract can be better handled by a theory based
on the parties' actual agreement, with a special rule carved out to
bind those who give the impression that they have made a promise, if
the hearer actually takes it as such. This misconceptualization of con-
tract law has lasted as long as it has in large part because the crucial
cases that display its weaknesses do not occur very often, certainly not
as often as those cases that appear tojustify the objective approach. In
the next Part, I will suggest some changes in the way we conceptualize
the law of contracts that may follow from these observations.
III. SOME CONSEQUENCES OF CONCEPTUALIZING CONTRACT
FORMATION AS SUBJECTIVE
Let us now explore what might change once we regard contract
formation as a matter of actual agreement rather than as a matter of
manifestations of agreement. First, it now becomes possible to look at
contractual remedies more flexibly. Courts need not award full
expectation damages in cases in which there has been neither mutual
assent nor substantial reliance.
150 See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 3.6, at 114-17; Russ VerSteeg, Intent,
Originality, Creativity and Joint Ownership, 68 BROOK. L. REv. 123, 148-49 (2002).
151 See, e.g.,Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, andForm, 64 IND. L.J. 155, 156 (1989);
James Boyle, Legal Realism and the Social Contract: Fuller's Public Jurisprudence of Form,
Private Jurisprudence of Substance, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 371, 386 n.67 (1993); Richard A.
Epstein, Reflections on the Historical Origins and Economic Structure of the Law Merchant, 5
CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 11 (2004).
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Second, legal doctrines governing contract formation and con-
tract interpretation are strangely out of tune with each other. While
contract formation is said to be an objective matter, contract interpre-
tation overtly focuses on the intent of the parties, tempered by eviden-
tiary considerations, such as the parol evidence rule. It makes little
sense to maintain this duality since the very promises that are con-
strued subjectively, when interpretation is at issue, began as the offer
that is supposedly interpreted objectively with respect to the forma-
tion process.
Third, there is an embarrassing inconsistency between the objec-
tive approach to contract formation and the doctrine of considera-
tion. The courts and the Restatement both regard contracts as
bargained-for exchanges. 152 But whether a promise is given in
exchange for some benefit has a strong intentional element. The the-
ory espoused here does not eliminate this inconsistency entirely, but
relegates it to situations in which evidentiary concerns trump the basic
rule of mutual assent.
Fourth, a number of doctrines relate to the problem of incom-
plete contracts. The doctrine of substantial performance, terms
implied by law, default rules, and rules for filling gaps in contracts all
concern themselves with situations that arise after the contract has
been formed, but which do not seem to be adequately covered by the
contract's express terms. Here again, courts frequently (but not
always) resort to the intention of the parties. In deciding how to fill
gaps, they take into account what parties ordinarily intend as a surro-
gate for what the parties in the dispute actually intended.
A. Providing Flexibility in Contract Remedies
I have argued that what is called the objective theory of contracts
is better understood as an exception to a system based upon mutual
assent. If this is correct, then it does not follow that the full contract
remedy of expectation damages should always be awarded when the
exception applies. Because the objective theory has become so deeply
entrenched, there has been no space in the doctrinal discourse to ask
whether such damages are justified in every case. The problem was
observed as early as 1929 in Professor Whittier's criticism of the first
Restatement.15 3 Whittier argued that the ordinary expectation dam-
ages that accompany breach of contract were too generous in cases
152 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 17, 71 (1981).
153 See Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon
Fuller's "Consideration and Form, " 100 COLUM. L. REv. 94, 145 (2000); Whittier, supra
note 20, at 441-49.
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where the promisor did not intend to bind himself and the promisee
had not yet acted to his detriment. 154 He would have distinguished
cases of innocent mistake from those in which the promisor intended
to mislead, and then disingenuously walked away from his commit-
ment by posing a 'just kidding" defense. 155 Plaintiffs in the first group
would be limited to reliance damages, if any. Those in the second
may be eligible to receive the benefit of the bargain that they believed
had been made. 15 6
This perspective is consistent with Professor Daniel Markovits'
important theory of contract as a collaborative enterprise. 157 Expecta-
tion damages, Markovits argues, are justified because, unlike reliance
damages, they "underwrite the central moral innovation that contract
represents-the collaborative relation of mutual respect that contract
involves."'158 As such, expectation damages "reflect the parties' ...
forward-looking commitment affirmatively to treat each other as ends
in themselves, which lies at the core of the collaborative relation estab-
lished through the contract."' 5 9 If the collaborative ideal justifies
expectation damages, cases in which there was no collaboration
because one party simply misspoke cannot justify the remedy, espe-
cially when there has been no reliance. In a similar vein, Professor
Wonnell argues that reliance damages are most appropriate when the
promisor's wrong occurs during the formation process, and that
expectation damages make more sense when, after agreement has
been reached, the promisor thwarts the collaboration by breaching.160
An interesting analogy can be made with the history of the reme-
dies called for by the two Restatements in promissory estoppel cases.
154 Whittier, supra note 20, at 442.
155 Id. at 445.
156 Put in other terms, Whittier would allow greater damages when the parties did
not have common knowledge of second- and third-order information. See id. at 444.
If one party did not agree to enter into a contract, and knows that the other party
thinks that an agreement has been reached, the law treats the situation as though this
disparity in knowledge were not the case, and does so to the disadvantage of the party
who attempted to take advantage of the situation. See generally Ian Ayres and BarryJ.
Nalebuff, Common Knowledge as a Barrier to Negotiation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1631 (1997)
(arguing that in some situations ignorance of higher-order information can preclude
strategic bargaining and make negotiations more efficient).
157 Markovits, supra note 19, at 1497-514.
158 Id. at 1504.
159 Id.
160 Christopher T. Wonnell, Expectation, Reliance, and the Two Contractual Wrongs,
38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 53, 68-69 (2001). For an alternative view, which distinguishes
between opportunistic and nonopportunistic breaches, see generally George M.
Cohen, Finding Fault with Wonnel's "Two Contractual Wrongs, " 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
137 (2001).
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The first Restatement, which introduced the concept, did not provide
for limiting damages in these cases. 1 6 1 It is the second Restatement,
drafted in 1965, that suggests limiting damages "as justice requires" in
promissory estoppel claims. 1 62 Typically, this limitation is understood
to permit courts to award reliance damages in lieu of expectation
damages. 16 3 As Professor Seavey had explained in a 1951 article,
The wrong is not primarily in depriving the plaintiff of the prom-
ised reward but in causing the plaintiff to change position to his
detriment. It would follow that the damages should not exceed the
loss caused by the change of position, which would never be more
in amount, but might be less, than the promised reward.1 64
Professor Seavey's approach later became the basis for the decision of
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores,16 5 a case
still read today to illustrate the proposition that damages for promis-
sory estoppel are generally limited in this way. 16 6
How often the courts actually take advantage of this flexibility
remains a matter of some debate. 167 Moreover, others have ques-
tioned the wisdom of the limitation, arguing that promissory estoppel
cases are not a matter of negligent misrepresentation, which might
justify reliance damages, but rather intentional statements that should
be given the full effect of a binding commitment, including expecta-
tion damages. ' 68
Notwithstanding these concerns about the limitation of remedies
in promissory estoppel cases, there is even more reason to give courts
flexibility when the promisor has become bound inadvertently. For
one thing, as Gregory Klass has pointed out to me, 1 69 cases like Lucy v.
Zehmer, unlike the classic promissory estoppel cases, really are a matter
of negligent misrepresentation. The problem in that case is not that
the words of the drunken promisor might come back to haunt him,
but that he lost his property as a result. Were the system flexible
161 RESTATEMENT OF CorACrRTcs § 329 (1932).
162 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
163 See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 4, at 52.
164 Warren A. Seavey, Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARv.
L. REv. 913, 926 (1951).
165 133 N.W.2d 267, 277 (Wis. 1965).
166 See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 3.26, at 196-97.
167 James Gordley, Enforcing Promises, 83 CAL. L. REv. 547, 568-70 (1995).
168 Compare W. David Slawson, The Role of Reliance in Contract Damages, 76 CORNELL
L. REv. 197, 199 (1990) (arguing that "estoppel damages should be limited by the
reliance measure"), with Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the "New Consensus" on Promis-
soy Estoppel: An Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 580, 604-06 (1998)
(demonstrating the crucial importance of reliance in promissory estoppel cases).
169 Gregory Klass brought this point up in a personal communication with me.
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enough to limit the award to reliance damages in such situations, the
case would be far less memorable.
In addition, cases governing promissory estoppel require that the
promisee engage in some significant action or refrain from doing so
for the reliance requirement to be met. In contrast, the doctrine of
formation estoppel illustrated by Embry, Hotchkiss, and the like,
requires only that the promisor reasonably manifest his intent and
that the promisee understand the manifestation in that sense whether
or not the promisee has acted or refrained from acting in reliance on
this understanding. This means that the recipient of such a statement
can take it to the bank even if he has done nothing by the time the
misunderstanding is discovered, and whether or not the statement was
an inadvertent slip or an effort to mislead.170
Expectation damages in these circumstances are hard to justify;
yet it is even more difficult to construct a doctrinal justification under
the standard objective theory for not awarding such damages. Once
we recognize, in contrast, that such cases are exceptions to a system of
obligation based upon mutual assent, it becomes possible to decide
anew what consequences should follow, as suggested some eighty
years ago by Professor Whittier.17 1
B. Harmonizing Formation and Interpretation
At the same time as courts profess to commit themselves to an
objective approach in their analysis of contract formation, they repeat
as a constant refrain in cases involving the interpretation of contracts
that their one concern is to discover the intent of the parties, and
reach a decision that will vindicate that intent. They say it so often
that it cannot be explained by an occasional reversion to a nineteenth
century-like slip of the tongue.
In fact, Learned Hand himself routinely invoked the intent of
contracting parties. Consider these examples:
It may be well in conclusion to say a word about the finality of
the finding which we are reversing. It is true that the contract was
not in writing-though a written contract was part of it-and, had
the case been tried to a jury, it is they who would have had to find
the "intention of the parties," had the evidence left it in doubt.
That "intent" is indeed a question of fact, though it is a hypotheti-
cal question, for its answer demands that the tribunal,judge or jury,
declare what the parties would have agreed to, had the occasion for
170 Professor Rakoff makes note of this difference. SeeRakoff, supra note 13, at 81.
171 See Whittier, supra note 20, at 444-45.
[VOL. 83:1a
CONTRACT AS AGREEMENT
which they had not specifically provided, been presented to
them. 17
2
The question is how we shall interpret the intent of the parties from
these facts .... 173
There are many more. 174
Nor is the phenomenon of speaking in objective terms about the
formation of contracts and subjective terms about their interpretation
limited to Judge Hand, or the federal courts in general. In one juris-
diction after another, courts say both that they subscribe to an objec-
tive theory, and that their function in resolving disputes is to discern
the parties' intent. For example, compare these two judicial state-
ments from Oregon:
Oregon uses an objective theory of contract interpretation. The
rule is that "whether the parties entered into an agreement . . .
depends on whether the parties agreed to the same, express terms
of the agreement."1 75
Oregon subscribes to the objective theory of contracts. 176
with these:
The court must interpret the wording of a contract to effectuate the
intentions of the parties, as those intentions can be determined
from that wording and other relevant circumstances. 17 7
"If a contract is ambiguous, the trier of fact will ascertain the intent
of the parties and construe the contract consistent with" that intent.
Specifically, if a term of the contract is ambiguous, the court will
"examine extrinsic evidence of the contracting parties' intent," if
such evidence is available. 178
172 E.F. Drew & Co. v. Reinhard, 170 F.2d 679, 683-84 (2d Cir. 1948).
173 In reWalker, 93 F.2d 281, 283 (2nd Cir. 1937).
174 See, e.g., Vines v. Gen. Outdoor Adver. Co., 171 F.2d 487, 492 (2d Cir. 1948);
Dwyer v. Crosby Co., 167 F.2d 567, 569 (2d Cir. 1948); First Nat'l Bank of Chi. v.
Irving Trust Co., 74 F.2d 263, 264 (2d Cir. 1934).
175 Arboireau v. Adidas-Salomon AG, 347 F.3d 1158, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2003)
(quoting City of Canby v. Rinkes, 902 P.2d 605, 610 (Or. Ct. App. 1995)).
176 Newton v. Newton, 86 P.3d 49, 52 (Or. Ct. App. 2004).
177 Care Med. Equip., Inc. v. Baldwin, 15 P.3d 561, 563 (Or. 2000) (en banc) (cit-
ing Pettigrove v. Corvallis Lumber Mfg. Co., 21 P.2d 198, 199-200 (Or. 1933)).
178 Arlington Educ. Ass'n v. Arlington Sch. Dist. No. 3, 103 P.3d 1138, 1143 (Or.
Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Or. Sch. Employee Ass'n v. Rainier Sch. Dist. No. 13, 808
P.2d 83, 87 (Or. 1991); Yogman v. Parrott, 937 P.2d 1019, 1022 (Or. 1997)).
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I picked Oregon out of a hat. It is easy to find just this array of deci-
sions in states around the country, from Minnesota17
9 to Alabama,1 80
Alaska, 18 1 and Wyoming.
182
In principle, there is no reason why the law governing contracts
must use the same theoretical orientation for both formation and
interpretation questions, if the realities of commercial life suggest that
they be treated differently. Yet in practice, such a dual system would
be almost impossible to implement because the subjective aspect of
the interpretive process concerns itself with the parties' states of mind
during the formation process, which is exactly what has been declared
irrelevant by the objective theory of contract formation. There is no
two-step process in which a court first ignores the parties' intent to
determine if a contract was formed, and immediately thereafter relies
on the parties' intent with respect to the same events to determine
what the contract means. Such a regime would force courts to say that
they should care about intent and should not care about intent in
179 Compare Asia Pac. Indus. Corp. v. Rainforest Cafe, Inc., 380 F.3d 383, 385 (8th
Cir. 2004) ("'Minnesota follows the objective theory of contract formation, under
which an outward manifestation of assent is determinative, rather than a party's sub-
jective intent."' (quoting TNT Props., Ltd. v. Tri-Star Developers, LLC, 677 N.W.2d
94, 102 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004))), with Webb Bus. Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Elecs. &
Entm't Corp., 617 N.W.2d 67, 75 (Minn. 2000) ("The agreement necessary to form a
contract need not be express, but may be implied from circumstances that clearly and
unequivocally indicate the intention of the parties to enter into a contract.").
180 Compare Quality Truck & Auto Sales, Inc. v. Yassine, 730 So. 2d 1164,1168 (Ala.
1999) ("Courts generally accept the 'objective theory' of contracts, which determines
the existence of a contract based on 'the external or objective appearance of the
parties' intentions as manifested by their actions."' (quoting FARNSWORTH, supra note
7, § 3.6, at 114)), with FabArc Steel Supply, Inc. v. Composite Constr. Sys., 914 So. 2d
344, 358 (Ala. 2005) ("'[Tlhe intention of the party to a contract controls its interpre-
tation and ... to ascertain such intention, regard must be had to the subject matter,
the relationship of the parties at the time of the contract, and the law which it is justly
inferable they had in view while contracting."' (quoting G.F.A. Peanut Ass'n v. W.F.
Covington Planter Co., 192 So. 502, 506 (Ala. 1939))).
181 Compare Hendricks v. Knik Supply, Inc., 522 P.2d 543, 548 (Alaska 1974)
(Erwin, J., dissenting) ("We purport to follow the objective theory of contract inter-
pretation ... ."), with Betz v. Chena Hot Spings Group, 657 P.2d 831, 835 (Alaska
1982) ("Given such an ambiguity in the agreement, the primary function of judicial
interpretation should be to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties.").
182 Compare Bouwens v. Centrilift, 974 P.2d 941, 947 (Wyo. 1999) ("Under the
objective theory of assent, which courts, including this one, generally accept today,
one looks 'to the external objective appearance of the parties' intentions as mani-
fested by their actions."' (quoting FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, §3.6 at 114)), with
Hutchison v. Hill, 3 P.3d 242, 245 (Wyo. 2000) ("Most importantly, '[w]e seek to
determine and effectuate the intention of the parties ...... (quoting Anderson v.
Bommer, 926 P.2d 959, 961 (Wyo. 1996))).
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connection with the same event. When the actual intent is not to
incur some obligation, then a court might be forced first to hold that
a contract has been formed, and then to interpret that contract as not
containing the very obligation that comprised the contract. Again,
courts do not engage in such self-contradictory analysis.
Part of the problem is explained by observations made by Profes-
sor Eisenberg: offers are nothing more than conditional promises,
which mature into unconditional promises upon acceptance.1 8 3 As he
points out, "[W]hen an offer is understood as a promise there is no
need to explain why the offeror cannot walk away if his offer is
accepted. He cannot walk away because by making his offer he prom-
ised to perform on stated terms if his offer was properly accepted."18 4
Thus, when I offer to sell you my car for $5000, I am saying that I
promise to sell you my car for $5000 if you accept my offer within the
period that the offer stays alive. Once you accept it, the offer matures
into an unconditional promise, and you can count on having your
expectations met, whether I perform or not. Crucially, what we call
the offer during the formation process and the promise once a con-
tract has been formed is a single act of speech. There is no promise
apart from my offer that you accepted. We did not say later: "Now
that you've made an offer and I've accepted it, let's promise each
other to perform." Why should we? We had already made those
promises once my offer became unconditional. 185
This contradiction between formation and interpretation evapo-
rates, however, if we look at the formation rules as concerning them-
selves with intent as much as the interpretation rules do. Contracts
are formed when the parties reach an agreement. Contracts are con-
strued by discovering and enforcing the agreement that the parties
reached. In determining whether an agreement was reached and, if
so, what that agreement was, courts typically prefer objective evidence
over unexpressed intentions, unless the parties are in accord as to
what their unexpressed intent was.' 8 6 At various points in the inquiry,
183 Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Revocation of Offers, 2004 Wis. L. Rrv. 271, 275.
184 Id. at 276.
185 I put aside here issues such as letters of intent and agreements to agree, where
it is not clear whether the original discussions actually constituted an enforceable
promise.
186 See, e.g., Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 522 (1954) ("If the words or other acts
of one of the parties have but one reasonable meaning, his undisclosed intention is
immaterial . . . . 'The law, therefore, judges of an agreement between two persons
exclusively from those expressions of their intentions which are communicated
between them.'" (quoting WILLIAM LAWRENCE CLARK ET AL., HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS § 3, at 4 (4th ed. 1931))).
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these evidentiary concerns are expressed alternatively in terms of the
objective theory of contracts, the four corners rule,18 7 and the parol
evidence rule. But the goal is to determine actual intent to the extent
feasible.
This concern is ubiquitous and is expressed frequently and
unselfconsciously. Take the expression, "meeting of the minds,"
which scholars and treatises have declared legally defunct.18 8 No one,
however, has told the judges, lawyers, and parties to contract disputes,
who use the expression constantly.'89 Both federal and state courts
use the expression hundreds of times each year, sometimes as part of
their own analysis, at other times, making reference to the arguments
used by lawyers. 190
Or consider basic legal doctrine concerning the interpretation of
contracts. For the most part, it is subjective. Courts over and over
again claim that their principal goal in interpreting contractual lan-
guage is to enforce the will of the parties.' 91 Even the parol evidence
187 For a recent illustration of that rule, see Davis v. G.N. Mortgage Corp., 396 F.3d
869, 878 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Illinois adheres to a 'four corners rule' of contract interpre-
tation, which provides that 'an agreement, when reduced to writing, must be pre-
sumed to speak the intention of the parties who signed it. It speaks for itself, and the
intention with which it was executed must be determined from the language used."'
(quoting Air Safety, Inc. v. Teachers Realty Corp., 706 N.E.2d 882, 884 (Il1. 1999))).
188 See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 87 (1965) (noting
that the objective theory "insisted that the law enforce only the objective manifesta-
tions of agreement and rejected the notion that the essence of an enforceable con-
tract was a subjective 'meeting of the minds' of the parties"); Russ VerSteeg,
Rethinking Originality, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 841 (1993) ("[T]he so-called
'objective theory of contract' has almost universally replaced the 'meeting of the
minds' standard.").
189 For some recent examples, see Newsome v. Protective Industrial Insurance Co., 890
So. 2d 81, 87 (Ala. 2003) ("Like any other contract, a valid accord and satisfaction
requires consideration and a meeting of the minds regarding the subject matter.");
Janusauskas v. Fichman, 793 A.2d 1109, 1114 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) ("'[T]here must
be a meeting of the minds between the parties .... .' (quoting Burnham v. Karl &
Gelb, P.C., 717 A.2d 811, 813 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998))); and Potts Construction Co. v.
North Kootenai Water District, 116 P.3d 8, 11 (Idaho 2005) ("The minds of the parties
must meet as to all the terms before a contract is formed." (citation omitted)).
190 For example, a Lexis search ("meeting w/3 mind") yielded 948 hits for the
year 2006 over state and federal court decisions, and exceeded the maximum of 3,000
hits for the first seven years of the decade.
191 See, e.g., Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 375 F.3d
168, 177 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Under New York law, '[tihe fundamental, neutral precept
of contract interpretation is that agreements are construed in accord with the parties'
intent."' (quoting Greenfield v. Phillies Records, Inc., 780 N.E.2d 166, 170 (2002)
(footnote omitted))); MPACT Constr. Group, LLC v. Superior Concrete Construc-
tors, Inc., 802 N.E.2d 901, 906 (Ind. 2004) ("Whether the parties agreed to arbitrate
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rule, in both its strict traditional form and its more liberal modern
form, has as its goal the prevention of post hoc fabrication of negotiat-
ing history in the interest of increasing the likelihood that parties'
intent will be vindicated more often than not.192 This statement from
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit articulates
Pennsylvania's liberal version of the rule:
Pennsylvania contract law begins with the "firmly settled" point that
the intent of the parties to a written contract is contained in the
writing itself. Where the intention of the parties is clear, there is no
need to resort to extrinsic aids or evidence .... [W] here the con-
tract terms are ambiguous and susceptible of more than one reason-
able interpretation... the court is free to receive extrinsic evidence,
i.e., parol evidence, to resolve the ambiguity. . . . To determine
whether ambiguity exists in a contract, the court may consider "the
words of the contract, the alternative meaning suggested by coun-
sel, and the nature of the objective evidence to be offered in sup-
port of that meaning." 193
The stronger, traditional version is similarly justified by a quest
for intent.19 4 As a federal court recently explained:
Under Kansas law, the construction of a written contract is a
matter of law for the court. "The cardinal rule of contract interpre-
tation is that the court must ascertain the parties' intention and give
effect to that intention when legal principles so allow." Where a
contract is complete and unambiguous on its face, the court must
any disputes is a matter of contract interpretation, and most importantly, a matter of
the parties' intent."); Hartig Drug Co. v. Hartig, 602 N.W.2d 794, 797 (Iowa 1999) ("A
cardinal rule of contract construction or interpretation is the intent of the parties
must control."); ARYJewelers, L.L.C. v. Krigel, 82 P.3d 460, 466 (Kan. 2003) ("The
cardinal rule in contract interpretation is to ascertain the intention of the parties and
to give effect to that intention." (quoting Armstrong Bus. Servs. V. H & R Block, 96
S.W.3d 867, 874 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002))), rev'd on other grounds, 85 P.3d 1151 (Kan.
2004).
192 See Golden Pac. Bancorp v. FDIC, 273 F.3d 509, 517 (2d Cir. 2001); Bohler-
Uddeholm Am., Inc. v. Ellwood Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 79, 93 (3d Cir. 2001); Bass v.
Parsons (In re Parsons), 272 B.R. 735, 753 (D. Colo. 2001); see also Poole v. City of
Waterbury, 831 A.2d 211, 224 (Conn. 2003) ("[A] contract must be constructed to
effectuate the intent of the parties, which is determined ... in the light of the situa-
tion . .. and the circumstances connected with the transaction.").
193 Bohler-Uddeholm, 247 F.3d at 92-93 (quoting Krizovensky v. Krizovensky, 624
A.2d 638, 642 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)); see Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc.,
619 F.2d 1001, 1011 (3d Cir. 1980).
194 See Thatcher v. Kohl's Dep't Stores, Inc., 397 F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
Webb v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 207 F.3d 579, 582 (9th Cir. 2000); LDCircuit, LLC
v. Sprint Commc'ns Co., 364 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1255-56 (D. Kan. 2005); Beattie v.
State ex rel. Grand River Dam Auth., 41 P.3d 377, 382 (Okla. 2002).
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determine the parties' intent from the four corners of the docu-
ment, without regard to extrinsic or parol evidence. 19 5
At least as far as contract interpretation is concerned, the goal of the
analysis is the determination of subjective intent, with jurisdictions dif-
fering as to how much to require objective evidence of the parties'
earlier intentions. By looking at contract formation similarly, subject
to evidentiary rules to deter fraud, the law of contracts gains coher-
ence as a whole.
C. Objectivity and Definitions in the Law of Contracts
Much of the law governing the interpretation of contracts defers
to ordinary business practice. Karl Llewellyn's role in focusing the
Uniform Commercial Code on course of dealing, trade usage, and the
like has been a well-studied phenomenon. 196 At the same time, how-
ever, there are some striking disconnects between the commercial
world, on the one hand, and the concepts of contract law on the
other. In particular, definitions contained in the Restatement tend to
be devoid of intent, focusing instead on "manifestations of intent," in
order to keep them in line with the objective approach to contract
law. These definitions are inconsistent with ordinary usage, placing
them at odds with the law's goal of codifying everyday commercial
experience. Chief among these conceptual difficulties is the require-
ment of a bargain. For the most part, enforceable contracts are
exchange transactions. The Restatement puts it this way in section 17:
"Except as stated in Subsection (2), the formation of a contract
requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent
to the exchange and a consideration." 197
The exceptions in subsection (2) refer to doctrines that permit
enforcement without consideration, including promises to meet prior
legal duties, option contracts, and promissory estoppel. It is not my
goal here to argue one way or the other about the viability of the
exchange requirement as a motivating theory of contract law given
these many exceptions. 198 At the very least, it is beyond controversy
195 LDCircuit, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 1255-56 (quoting Ryco Packaging Corp. v. Chap-
pelle Int'l, Ltd., 926 P.2d 669, 674 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996)) (citations omitted).
196 See WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLWEWLLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 302-40
(1973).
197 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1981).
198 This has been the subject of a great deal of scholarly literature over the
decades. See, e.g., GILMORE, supra note 4, at 95-112; Peter A. Alces, Contract Recon-
ceived, 96 Nw. U. L. REx. 39 (2001); Barnett, supra note 50; Daniel A. Farber &John
H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake, "52
U. CHI. L. REv. 903, 925-45 (1985); Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM.
[VOL. 83:1
CONTRACT AS AGREEMENT
that exchange transactions are one way to form a binding contract,
and an important way at that. My focus here is on the inconsistency
between an objective approach to contract formation on the one
hand, and the consideration requirement on the other.
The bargain requirement of section 17 has two elements: mani-
festation of mutual assent and consideration. The mutual assent
requirement can be expressed in objective terms, as it is in the sec-
tions defining promise1 99 and offer,200 discussed in the previous Part.20 1
But the exchange requirement cannot be stated in terms that ignore
the participants' actual states of mind. On the contrary, the consider-
ation requirement is expressed and defined in section 71 using explic-
itly intentionalist language: It must be part of a bargain, which itself is
"sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by
the promisee in exchange for that promise." 20 2
What is the state of mind of a person seeking to enter into a bar-
gain? Seeking is an intentional act. It is at best a strained use of lan-
guage to say, for example, I unintentionally looked for a service contract for
my new computer. Looking for a service contract is something that I can
only do on purpose. That is part of the meaning of "looking for" or
"seeking." But if I cannot seek a bargain without doing so on purpose,
then I cannot enter into an agreement for consideration without
doing so on purpose either.
Courts routinely note that contracts are exchanges for considera-
tion, and they do so in intentionalist terms. For example, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit notes:
Contract law rests on obligations imposed by bargain. The law of
contracts is designed to effectuate exchanges and to protect the
expectancy interests of parties to private bargained-for agreements.
Contract law, therefore, seeks to hold commercial parties to their
promises, ensuring that each party receives the benefit of their
bargain. 20 3
Thus, there appears to be some inconsistency between the bar-
gain requirement, on the one hand, and the objective approach to
contract formation on the other. The Restatement attempts to
L. REV. 799, 815-19 (1941); Fuller & Perdue, supra note 4, at 46; Duncan Kennedy,
From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller's "Consideration and
Form", 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 169-75 (2000); Roy Kreitner, The Gift Beyond the Grave:
Revisiting the Question of Consideration, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1876, 1950 (2001).
199 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 2 (1981).
200 Id. § 24.
201 See supra Part II.B.
202 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(2).
203 Rich Prods. Corp. v. Kemutec Inc., 241 F.3d 915, 918 (7th Cir. 2001).
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address this problem by expanding the objective nature of contract
law to include not only the promise requirement, but also the
exchange requirement: "§ 3. Agreement Defined; Bargain Defined:
An agreement is a manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two
or more persons. A bargain is an agreement to exchange promises or
to exchange a promise for a performance or to exchange perform-
ances." 20 4 Since bargain is defined in terms of agreement and agreement
is defined in terms of a manifestation of mutual assent, it is possible to
understand a bargain as a manifestation of mutual assent to exchange
promises, etc.
This approach, however, is problematic. For one thing, it is
inconsistent with the subjective nature of bargaining as that term is
defined in section 71. While bargains may typically leave evidence of
an intent to enter into an exchange transaction, exchange transac-
tions themselves are those in which the parties reached agreement
after "seeking" to enter into an exchange, as the Restatement puts it,
and seeking cannot be reduced to manifestations without regard to the
parties' intentions.
The most obvious solution to this incoherence is to declare the
bargain requirement to be objective, just as the promise requirement
purports to be objective. Thus, courts might say that they are not con-
cerned with whether the parties actually entered into a bargained-for
exchange, but only with whether they appear to have done so. But
courts do not routinely do this. It is one thing to estop a party from
relying on an unexpressed intent not to live up to a commitment that
the promisee actually and reasonably understood him to make. It is
quite another to hold irrelevant undisputed facts about what the par-
ties intended to accomplish in favor of a theory based only on
appearances.
When courts concern themselves with bargained-for exchanges,
they really do care about what bargain was reached between the par-
ties, and they say so. For example, in United States v. Robison,20 5 the
issue before the Sixth Circuit was the scope of a plea bargain agree-
ment.20 6 The defendant argued that an agreement reached in one
case precluded subsequent prosecutions in others.20 7 The court
rejected this argument in the strongest intentionalist terms.20 8 After
204 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1981).
205 924 F.2d 612 (6th Cir. 1991).
206 Id. at 614.
207 Id. at 613.
208 Id. at 614.
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emphasizing that traditional contract doctrine applies to the interpre-
tation of plea bargains, 20 9 the court held:
There can be no contract without a "meeting of the minds."
Whether or not there was a "meeting of the minds" depends, of
course, on what the parties to the plea agreement intended. The
district court found that the parties to the North Carolina agree-
ment never intended to limit prosecution in other districts. This
determination is not clearly erroneous. In fact, the circumstances
of this case strongly support the result reached by the district
court.
2 1 0
The court concluded, "The circumstances of this case disclose that it
was intended by neither the United States Attorney for the Eastern
District of North Carolina nor Robison that the North Carolina plea
agreement have any effect on the prosecution in the Eastern District
of Michigan." 2 11 The court earnestly engaged in an effort to identify
the bargain that the parties reached, and enforce it. Courts often
speak in such terms.2 12
This is not to say that one cannot speak of the bargain require-
ment in objective terms and demand objective evidence of the bar-
gain. It is not unreasonable for courts to insist upon objective
evidence, rather than permitting self-serving statements of the unex-
pressed desires of the parties, and they do.2 13 Unlike the concept of
assent, which is wholly cognitive, bargaining requires interaction
between the bargainers, which means that there almost always will be
objective evidence when a bargain has occurred.
As they do when they discuss offering and promising, courts do
indeed bring objective considerations into an analysis of whether a
bargained-for exchange is alleged. At times, they deny a party relief
for failure to produce objective evidence of a bargain, and at other
times they employ an objective rule and dispense with the bargained-
for exchange requirement altogether. But when courts do actually
write about bargains, they write about them the way people would do
so in everyday life. They include an element of intent, and discuss the
209 Id. at 613.
210 Id. at 614 (citation omitted).
211 Id.
212 See, e.g., Trans-Orient Marine Corp. v. Star Trading Marine, Inc., 925 F.2d 566,
573 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[F]orbearance to assert a valid claim, if bargained for, is suffi-
cient consideration to support a contract."); Romero v. Earl, 810 P.2d 808, 810 (N.M.
1991) ("Consideration adequate to support a promise is essential to enforcement of
the contract and must be bargained for by the parties.").
213 See, e.g., Bennett v. Emerson Elec. Co., 186 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1171 (D. Kan.
2002); Standard Mgmt., Inc. v. Kekona, 53 P.3d 264, 275 (Haw. Ct. App. 2001).
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parties' states of mind naturally, as though they had never heard of an
objective theory of contracts.
What about the definitions of terms such as offer and promise,
which are stated in objective terms? To the extent that I am correct in
my analysis of contract formation, it should be possible to dispense
with them for the most part. An offer is an offer. A promise is a prom-
ise. A bargain is a bargain. The law prefers objective evidence of these
concepts, and estops parties from denying the consequences of their
actions with respect to them.
The Restatement defines offer as follows: "§ 24. Offer Defined: An
offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so
made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to
that bargain is invited and will conclude it."214 Missing from the defi-
nition is any state of mind with respect to the manifestation. But state
of mind is very much part of our ordinary understanding of offers.
Consider what we think of as an offer, using the following
vignette. You arrive at a cocktail party. The host approaches you with
a tray of drinks. You say "thank you" and reach for one. The host
laughs and says, "Not so fast. These are for Mario and Adela. You
haven't even told me what you want yet." You smile, and ask for a gin
and tonic, which your host brings you soon.
Would you say-outside of any legal context-that the host
offered you a drink? I doubt it. You would say that you reasonably
thought from the physical circumstances that he had offered you a
drink, but that you were wrong. And the reason you were wrong is
that the host never intended to offer you a drink, and intent is part of
your concept of offering.
This analysis of natural language leads to several legally relevant
points. First, to the extent that unintentional manifestations of will-
ingness to enter into a transaction are enforced, they are not enforced
because they are offers in the everyday sense, since they are not offers
at all. Rather, they are enforced because the law does not permit indi-
viduals to walk away from the reasonable understanding of their
words, given that the other party actually understood them in their
ordinary sense. Thus, when McKittrick told Embry not to worry in
response to Embry's inquiry about whether his employment would be
renewed for another year, McKittrick did not make an offer if he was
trying only to put off an irritating employee. Nonetheless, he was
appropriately bound by the commitment that he expressed.
214 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981).
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Second, the intent required for an offer is not the intent to per-
form the act being offered, as Peter Tiersma points out.2 15 The intent
is merely an intent to make an offer. Put in the language of the
Restatement, an offer in the context of a contract is an intentional
"manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain. '21 6 If the host
says that he'll bring you your gin and tonic, but does not-perhaps
because he knows that you are today's designated driver-he has still
made an offer, but has not honored it. He had the requisite intent.
Finally, both offers and promises are typically understood as con-
taining at least some level of sincerity, although we regard them as
binding even when insincere. That is, while intent to manifest com-
mitment is part of what it means to make a promise or offer, intent to
do what one actually offers or promises is not required for us to
regard the statement as an offer or promise, but it is routinely
inferred. In their thoughtful book, Ian Ayres and Gregory Klass write
about the law governing promissory fraud in just these terms: "In most
cases, a promisor's representation that she intends to perform does
not require a separate utterance ... but it is understood to be part of
the meaning of the very act of promising."217 Promises, they argue,
contain at least some implication that the speaker does not intend not
to perform, even if the promisor does not have a strong intention
actually to perform. 2 18 Thus, while Holmes' statement, "[t]he duty to
keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay
damages if you do not keep it,-and nothing else,"2 19 may character-
ize contract law in a narrow sense, it certainly does not preclude the
availability of fraud as a claim against those who are insincere in their
promises. And insincerity is a matter of intent: saying that you will do
something when you had no intention of carrying out your
commitment.
Although this Article might not trigger a broad movement to cor-
rect these definitions, my analysis of contract law as based largely on
the actual agreements of the parties explains why it is that courts are
willing at the same time to pronounce the triumph of objectivism on
the one hand, and to talk incessantly about the parties' states of mind
on the other. The law of contracts contains primitives that are highly
intentional concepts. Legal actors are not sufficiently adept at sus-
215 Peter Meijes Tiersma, Comment, The Language of Offer and Acceptance: Speech
Acts and the Question of Intent, 74 CAL. L. REv. 189, 224 (1986). Tiersma uses the
expression "illocutionary intent" to describe this fact. Id.
216 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981).
217 AYRES & KLASS, supra note 90, at 202.
218 See id. at 21-26.
219 Holmes, supra note 68, at 462.
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pending their understanding of the world to avoid speaking of intent
no matter how the Restatement defines these terms.
D. Incomplete Contracts: Gap-Filling, Default Rules and Implied Terms
The account of contract formation based upon mutual assent
espoused in this Article also reduces the conceptual gap between doc-
trines addressing incomplete contracts on the one hand, and contract
formation on the other. Judicial implication of contractual terms, the
doctrine of substantial performance, default rules, and gap-filling are
frequently based upon estimations of what the parties would have
intended had they thought through the details that are currently
under dispute. Such analyses have their limits, as a prolific literature
points out.2 20 But they would make no sense whatsoever if contract
formation were objective in nature. It would be difficult to justify a
theory that did not concern itself with what the parties intended when
they formed an incomplete contract, but then went to great lengths to
estimate how these same people would have filled in missing terms
based on their actual states of mind.
Consider the doctrine of substantial performance. The classic
statement of its rationale is contained in Cardozo's opinion in Jacob &
Youngs, Inc. v. Kent,2 2 1 decided in 1921. A contractor agreed to build a
house for $77,000.222 The contract called for the last payment to be
made only after the architect certified that the house had been built
to specification. 223 Instead of using Reading pipe, as called for in the
contract, the plumbing subcontractor had used some Reading pipe,
and some pipe that appeared to be equivalent to Reading pipe, but
manufactured by a different company.224 Based on this discrepancy,
the architect refused to sign the certification releasing the final pay-
ment, and the contractor sued. 225 The case made its way to the New
York Court of Appeals. In a 4-3 decision Cardozo framed the issue as
whether payment of the last installment should be conditioned on
completing the building exactly as designed, or whether payment and
completion should be seen as independent promises, allowing the
owner to claim damages if the house is worth less than the one he
ordered, but otherwise requiring the owner to pay. 226 Because the
220 See HILLMAN, supra note 95, at 224-36; see also infra note 261.
221 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
222 Id. at 890.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 891.
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building had been substantially completed as designed, Cardozo
chose the latter option. 227 To rule otherwise would result in an
unduly harsh (and inefficient) outcome since the contractor would
forfeit a great deal more than the owner would realize. 228 Cardozo
explained this in intentionalist terms:
From the conclusion that promises may not be treated as depen-
dent to the extent of their uttermost minutiae without a sacrifice of
justice, the progress is a short one to the conclusion that they may
not be so treated without a perversion of intention. Intention not
otherwise revealed may be presumed to hold in contemplation the
reasonable and probable. If something else is in view, it must not
be left to implication. There will be no assumption of a purpose to
visit venial faults with oppressive retribution. 229
More contemporary courts argue similarly.230 By the same token,
courts holding that substantial performance is not adequate to meet
contractual obligations often do so by ascribing a contrary intent to
the parties.2 3 1
Cardozo's argument is precisely the one used to justify the ordi-
nary meaning rule in the interpretation of contracts and statutes. We
privilege the ordinary meaning because, by doing so we are more
likely to enforce the ex ante intent of the contracting parties. Simi-
larly, we infer that, if asked in advance, most reasonable people would
understand their obligations as consistent with the substantial per-
formance doctrine, at least as applied to constructive conditions.
A second well-studied Cardozo opinion, which deals with implied
terms in contracts relies on similar argumentation. In Wood v. Lucy,
Lady Duff-Gordon,232 a designer of clothing who had given Wood an
exclusive right to sell her designs, went off on her own and bypassed
Wood, depriving him of his commission. 233 When he sued, she
argued that the contract failed for lack of consideration since Wood
never had an obligation to sell anything. 23 4 Had he moved to Tahiti
without selling a single design, the only consequence would have been
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 See, e.g., Phoenix Office Sys., Inc. v. Kopp, No. 92-1877, 1993 Wisc. App. LEXIS
425, at *7-10 (Wisc. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 1993).
231 See Am. Cont'l Life Ins. Co. v. Ranier Constr. Co., 607 P.2d 372, 375 (Ariz.
1980); Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 660 N.E.2d 415, 418
(N.Y. 1995).
232 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
233 Id. at 214.
234 Id.
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that he would earn no commissions. 23 5 A unanimous court rejected
this argument, basing its holding on the implied intent of the parties:
The implication is that the plaintiff's business organization will
be used for the purpose for which it is adapted. But the terms of
the defendant's compensation are even more significant. Her sole
compensation for the grant of an exclusive agency is to be one-half
of all the profits resulting from the plaintiff's efforts. Unless he
gave his efforts, she could never get anything. Without an implied
promise, the transaction cannot have such business "efficacy as both
parties must have intended that at all events it should have." 23 6
The implied covenant of good faith is similarly justified by courts that
resolve cases based on its presence. 237
Judges often justify gap-filling the same way. Courts fill gaps in
contracts in order to effectuate the intent of the parties when they
failed to state all of the contract's details in advance. 238 This perspec-
tive on gap-filling and implied terms has also been prominent in the
academic literature. For example, Judge Posner remarks:
Filling potential gaps in contracts should be distinguished from
disambiguating specific terms, which is the heart of the problem of
contract interpretation. A contract might contain an explicit best-
efforts clause, yet the wording of the clause might leave a doubt as
to what exactly it required of the dealer. Gap filling and dis-
ambiguating are both, however, "interpretive" in the sense that they
are efforts to determine how the parties would have resolved the
issue that has arisen had they foreseen it when they negotiated their
contract.
239
This intentionalist perspective is consistent with the economic
approach to gap-filling as well, since economists assume that the par-
ticipants to a transaction are more likely to understand their best
interests than do academic legal theorists. Thus, the intent of the par-
235 Id.
236 Id. at 214-15 (citation omitted).
237 See, e.g., R.I. Charities Trust v. Engelhard Corp., 109 F. Supp. 2d 66, 78 (D.R.I.
2000) (implying good faith in order to effectuate the intent of the parties).
238 See, e.g., Hold Bros. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 357 F. Supp. 2d 651, 657
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("[U]nder New York law, a court may fill the gap in order to effectu-
ate the intent of the parties."); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tan, 691 F. Supp. 1271,
1273 (S.D. Cal. 1988) ("[T]he court has a duty to fill in the gaps of the contract to
preserve and effectuate the overall intentions of the contracting parties.").
239 Posner, supra note 126, at 1586; see also CharlesJ. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The
Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REv. 967,
971 (1983) ("Ideally, the preformulated rules supplied by the state should mimic the
agreements contracting parties would reach were they costlessly to bargain out each
detail of the transaction.").
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ties serves as a proxy for efficient decision making in contract forma-
tion. 240  Professor Goldberg makes a similar point, using as
illustrations the two Cardozo opinions discussed above. 241
Default rules are treated similarly, at least in many instances.
Often, the default rules are themselves "majoritarian," as law and eco-
nomics analysts point out.242 That is, the rules are designed to simu-
late what most contracting parties would have agreed upon had they
addressed the issue. The goal, according to this perspective, is effi-
ciency. 2 43 The transaction costs in reaching agreement are reduced
when the law already contains the provisions that parties would have
accepted anyway, thereby permitting more productive activity at less
cost.244 The goal is not to simulate the intent of the parties because
intent is a core value in its own right, but rather to simulate the intent
of the parties in the majority of cases to produce a more efficient sys-
tem in the aggregate. The literature contains a number of creative
suggestions for accomplishing this task, largely by evaluating various
considerations that lead parties to accept default rules of one sort or
another notwithstanding efficiency concerns.2 45
Some default rules, however, have as their direct goal increasing
the likelihood that a court will reach the result that the parties would
have intended had their contract not been incomplete. Among these
are the reliance on trade usage and prior dealings in the Uniform
Commercial Code. 246 Courts frequently adduce trade usage as evi-
240 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 96-98 (7th ed. 2007).
241 VICTOR P. GOLDBERG, Reading Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon with Help from
the Kewpie Dolls, in FRAMING CoNrRACr LAW 43, 62-67 (2006). Professor Goldberg also
argues that Cardozo may have gotten the case wrong. Extrinsic evidence suggests that
the parties may well have intentionally left open the extent of any efforts due in light
of another agency contract of Wood's that had resulted in litigation. Id. at 50.
242 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Analysis of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 93 (1989); Ian Ayres & Robert Gert-
ner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1591, 1591 (1999) [herein-
after Ayres & Gertner, Majoritarian]; Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and
Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. Rv. 608, 614 (1998).
243 See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note 239, at 971 (arguing that default rules pro-
mote efficiency by "eliminating the cost of negotiating every detail of the proposed
argument").
244 Other legal systems appear to be more successful at reducing the burden on
contracting parties through the codification of standard terms. See Claire A. Hill &
Christopher King, How Do German Contracts Do as Much with Fewer Words?, 79 CHI-KENT
L. REV. 889, 912-14 (2004).
245 See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, Majoritarian, supra note 242, at 1606.
246 U.C.C. § 2-206 (2006).
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dence of actual intent, the enforcement of which is a goal in itself.2 4 7
While some commentators argue rather persuasively that ordinary
trade usage is a poor substitute for the actual wishes of the parties in
many instances,248 courts continue to employ the standard and to
associate it with the parties' intent.2
4 9
Here again, my argument is not that the "incorporation" 250 of
trade practice into the law of contracts is a good idea on either eco-
nomic or intentionalist grounds. Rather, my point is that the inten-
tionalist rhetoric that so frequently surrounds its use makes sense only
to the extent that contract formation is itself a function of the parties'
mutual assent. Its use is further consistent with the general approach
of seeking objective evidence of actual intent. One can argue about
how well resort to trade usage actually approximates the actual expec-
tations of the parties, but it would be hard to justify reference to trade
usage at all if unexpressed intent were so wholly irrelevant to the for-
mation process.
Not all gap-filling, however, proceeds along these lines. Implied
warranties 251 and default damages rules, 2 5 2 for example, to which the
system defaults in the absence of agreement to the contrary, need not
reflect the decisions that sellers or buyers would make on their
own.253 Such rules may be justified on either efficiency or paternalis-
247 See, e.g., Elda Arnhold & Byzantio, L.L.C. v. Ocean At. Woodland Corp., 284
F.3d 693, 701 (7th Cir. 2002) (explaining that trade usage is helpful in coming to an
understanding of the parties' intent); Den Norske Bank AS v. First Nat'l Bank of Bos-
ton, 75 F.3d 49, 58 (1st Cir. 1996) ("The precise function of 'usage of trade' evidence
is to provide circumstantial proof of the contracting parties' intent."); Precision Steel
Warehouse, Inc. v. Anderson-Martin Mach. Co., 854 S.W.2d 321, 325 (Ark. 1993) (sug-
gesting that usage of trade is competent evidence of parties' intent); Buchholz Mortu-
aries, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 113 S.W.3d 192, 194 (Mo. 2003) (explaining that trade
usage is a relevant fact in determining the intent of parties).
248 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's Incorporation
Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 710, 750-51 (1999).
249 See, e.g., Maverick Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Barburton City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 872
N.E.2d 322, 328 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007); Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773,
784-85 (Wash. 2004).
250 The term "incorporation" is frequently used in the literature to describe the
practice of absorbing trade practice into the constellation of contractual rights and
obligations. See Bernstein, supra note 248, at 746-60; Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and
the Evolution of Social Norms, 26J. LEGAL STUD. 377, 377 (1997).
251 See U.C.C. § 2-314 (2006) (outlining implied warranty of merchantability); id.
§ 2-315 (outlining implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose).
252 See id. § 2-715(2) (consequential damages).
253 See id. § 2-207 (calling for such rules to supplement the actual agreement of
the parties when they have agreed that a contract exists, but disagree on its terms); id.
§ 2-316 (exclusion or modification of warranties); id. § 2-719(3) (permitting parties to
limit or exclude consequential damages).
[VOL. 83:1
CONTRACT AS AGREEMENT
tic grounds. My point is not that mutual assent is the only concept
needed to explain the law of contracts. Rather, it is that the law gov-
erning contract formation is organized around the concept of mutual
assent, and that the recognition of its central role will help to harmo-
nize our understanding of the formation process with numerous
other doctrines. That is true with respect to a host of situations involv-
ing default rules, although it is not universally the case with respect to
default rules.
CONCLUSION: THE SUBJECTIVE THEORY AND ITS LIMITATIONS
I have argued in this Article that for a century judges and aca-
demics alike have mistakenly referenced an objective theory of con-
tracts that does not exist and has never existed. Dispensing with the
fiction of an objective theory of contract in favor of a theory based
upon mutual intent has a number of theory-internal benefits:
* It is more directly consistent with justificatory theories of con-
tract law, in particular, the vindication of the autonomous deci-
sions of the parties.
" It is descriptively more adequate.
* It licenses a more flexible approach to contract remedies when
there has been neither mutual assent nor substantial reliance.
" It allows the rules governing contract formation and contract
interpretation to be harmonized-an important result because
contract interpretation is conducted with respect to the same
events that constitute contract formation.
" Because consideration doctrine relies upon the concept of a
bargained-for exchange, and because bargaining has an indis-
pensable" subjective element, it adds coherence to the rules of
contract formation.
" It eliminates a peculiar incoherence concerning gap-filling and
related doctrines concerning incomplete contracts, which are
frequently based upon the intent of the parties, which, accord-
ing to the objective approach is irrelevant to the formation of
those parts of the contract that actually exist.
All of these contributions improve our conceptualization of con-
tract law by making it more coherent and better able to explain core
cases. In contrast, nothing in my analysis necessitates change in the
substance of contract law other than a more flexible approach to dam-
ages when a party is being held to a bargain he did not intend to
make. I conclude, then, with some thoughts about why I believe the
observations in this Article to be of some importance, and about some
of the limitations of this analysis.
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First, the law of contracts has a great deal to say about how busi-
ness is conducted. Since Karl Llewellyn's drafting of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 25 4 it has been widely accepted that contract law
itself must be responsive to normal business practices. Were it not, it
would not have remained relatively stable to the extent that the same
doctrines are taught to law students from one generation to the next.
This suggests, perhaps ironically for an academic paper, that the valid-
ity of my argument rests in part on it not disturbing the status quo
significantly. For if what has been called the objective theory had
been causing havoc, then the business community whose conduct is
governed by these rules would surely have advocated for change over
the decades. Thus, for the most part, the strength of my argument is
that it adds coherence and consistency to our conceptualization of
contract law. 255 It is entirely appropriate to suggest that we should
prefer one theory over another based on questions of descriptive ade-
quacy and coherence.
Second, this project was motivated by difficulty in teaching con-
tract law given some of the problems with conventional contract the-
ory described in this Article. Right from the beginning, it is possible
to tell students that the law of contracts is about mutual assent, and
favors objective evidence of that assent in various ways that will come
out as they learn the various doctrines.
At the same time, any legitimate critique of contract law's reli-
ance on mutual assent surely applies to my account. For example, in
an interesting article and exchange, Omri Ben-Shahar has argued that
mutual assent should be replaced by a no-retraction principle that
allows one party to bind the other with progressively increasing firm-
ness as negotiations proceed, even in the absence of actual mutual
assent. 256 The notion is that parties who commit themselves to aspects
254 For discussion, see generally TWINING, supra note 196 (detailing in depth Karl
Llewellyn's and the Realist Movement's contextual approach to contract law); Eugene
F. Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and Karl's New Kode: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of
Our New Commercial Law, 11 VILL. L. REV. 213, 214 (1966) ("Professor Karl Llewellyn
implemented his ideas on the law of contract by imbedding them into the Uniform
Commercial Code in such a manner that they are now virtually inextricable."). For
recent developments to the contrary, see Gregory E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn's Fading
Imprint on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 541, 584
(2000).
255 See generally Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal
Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 520-83 (2004) (presenting research on the
cognitive psychology topic of "coherence-based reasoning" and applying it to the legal
world).
256 Omri Ben-Shahar, Contracts Without Consent: Exploring a New Basis for Contractual
Liability, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1829, 1848-50 (2004).
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of a transaction during negotiations should not be free to walk away
from the deal prior to full agreement being reached. Rather, the law
should recognize the reality of the fact that contractual commitments
are frequently made incrementally. By eliminating the "all-or-noth-
ing" rule of mutual assent, Ben-Shahar argues, among other things,
that the problem of one party holding up the other as a result of infor-
mation disclosed during negotiations will be reduced. 25 7 Liability and
damages proceed along a continuum, with the measure of damages
changing as a deal becomes more and more settled.
Ben-Shahar's proposal has triggered debate. Ronald Mann
argues that some of Ben-Shahar's assumptions about the economic
consequences of the bargaining process are questionable. 2 58 Daniel
Markovits argues that Ben-Shahar's notion of obligation arising from
the negotiation process is not always appropriately grounded in the
morals of obligation. 259 I tend to agree with these critical assessments.
However, as Ben-Shahar points out, the all-or-nothing problem with
conventional contract theory exists regardless of whether one adopts a
subjective or objective approach to contract formation. 260 If Ben-
Shahar is right, then the theory of contracts should be adjusted
whether or not the approach to contract espoused in this article is
more convincing than the standard objective account.
Similar points have been made for years by those who espouse a
relational approach to the law of contracts. Their argument focuses
more on the changing nature of business relations after the legally-
relevant formation process has been completed. 26 1 In fact, those per-
forming contracts on behalf of firms have probably never even read
the document, relying instead on business norms and the develop-
257 Id. at 1867.
258 RonaldJ. Mann, Commentary, Contracts-Only with Consent, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
1873, 1876 (2004).
259 Daniel Markovits, Commentary, The No-Retraction Principle and the Morality of
Negotiations, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1903, 1921 (2004).
260 See Ben-Shahar, supra note 256, at 1835.
261 For discussion of relational contract theory, see generally Symposium, Rela-
tional Contract Theory: Unanswered Questions, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 737 (2000) (discussing
various aspects of relational contract theory); Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of
Contract, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 465 (examining the "gap between the academic model of
contract law and the system as it works" and calling for the establishment of a more
complex model); Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incom-
plete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992) (discussing the
relational theory of contract law as it applies to judicial gap-filling of incomplete con-
tracts). For a helpful summary of this literature, see HLLMAN, supra note 95, at
241-66.
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ment of the relationship with the other contracting party.26 2 To the
extent that these observations are accurate, they raise a question of
whether a theory of contract formation based on mutual assent is rele-
vant to a system of transactions based on business norms, and if so,
whether its relevance is positive or leads to unwanted distortions in
business practice.26 3 Similarly, those who criticize resort to intent
because the parties most likely had no intent with respect to many
litigated issues may find this analysis unable to present a realistic pic-
ture of business engagement.
2 64
These concerns are legitimate. The question of the appropriate
role of business norms in the law of contracts has received a great deal
of attention. However, its resolution is well outside the scope of this
project. The argument here is that the law governing contract forma-
tion is organized largely around the notion of actual mutual assent. If
it turns out that as a normative matter mutual assent plays too great a
role in the law governing contracts, then the positions taken in this
Article are surely as vulnerable as any other account. For at least the
time being, though, I have set as a goal the task of laying out an
account of contract formation that is both more true to the outcomes
of legal disputes and more in keeping with other legal doctrines.
262 See Claire A. Hill, A Comment on Language and Norms in Complex Business Con-
tracting, 77 CHI.-KErr L. REV. 29, 34 (2001).
263 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765, 1787-95 (1996).
264 SeeJeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Bewitchment of Intelligence: Language and Ex Post Illu-
sions of Intention, 78 TEMP. L. REv. 99, 116-40 (2005).
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